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We study the functioning and possible breakdown of the interbank market in the 
presence of counterparty risk. We allow banks to have private information about the 
risk of their assets. We show how banks’ asset risk affects funding liquidity in the 
interbank market. Several interbank market regimes can arise: i) normal state with low 
interest rates; ii) turmoil state with adverse selection and elevated rates; and iii) 
market breakdown with liquidity hoarding. We provide an explanation for observed 
developments in the interbank market before and during the 2007-09 financial crisis 
(dramatic increases of unsecured rates and excess reserves banks hold, as well as the 
inability of massive liquidity injections by central banks to restore interbank activity). 
We use the model to discuss various policy responses.  
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Non-Technical Summary 
Interbank markets play a key role in banks’ liquidity management and the 
transmission of monetary policy. They provide benchmark rates for the pricing of 
fixed-income securities throughout the economy (e.g. LIBOR). In normal times, 
interbank markets are among the most liquid in the financial sector. Since August 
2007, however, the functioning of interbank markets has become severely impaired 
around the world. As the financial crisis deepened in September 2008, liquidity in the 
interbank market has further dried up as banks preferred hoarding cash instead of 
lending it out even at short maturities. Central banks’ massive injections of liquidity 
did little to restart interbank lending. The failure of the interbank market to 
redistribute liquidity has become a key feature of the 2007-09 crisis (see, for example, 
Allen and Carletti, 2008, and Brunnermeier, 2009). 
What caused the interbank market to seize up? Why has the market been 
dysfunctional for so long despite interventions by public authorities? What frictions 
can explain these developments and how do they relate to the broader roots of the 
financial crisis? And how do the policy responses that were discussed or implemented 
around the world hold up against these frictions? 
This paper provides a model of how the risk of banks’ long-term assets can lead to 
the evaporation of liquidity in the unsecured interbank market. The key friction in the 
model is counterparty risk. Asymmetric information amplifies the friction. We use the 
model to understand the qualitative developments prior to and during the financial 
crisis, and to shed light on policy responses. We model banks as maturity transformers 
that face a trade-off between liquidity and return. Banks trade in the interbank market 
to smooth out idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. Lending banks face counterparty risk 
stemming from the risk of borrowing banks’ assets. Each bank knows the distribution 
of risk in the banking sector and is privately informed about the risk of its own assets 
but banks cannot observe the risk of their counterparties. 
Various interbank market regimes arise depending on the level and distribution of 
counterparty risk. First, when the level and dispersion of risk are low, the unsecured 
interbank market functions smoothly despite counterparty risk and asymmetric 
information. The interest rate for unsecured loans is low and all banks manage their 
liquidity using the interbank market. Riskier banks exert an externality on safer banks 6
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as the latter subsidize the liquidity of the former. But the cost is small compared to the 
cost of obtaining liquidity outside the unsecured market. Second, for higher levels of 
risk there can be adverse selection in the interbank market. The externality on safer 
banks is so costly that they leave the unsecured market. Liquidity is still traded but the 
interest rate rises to reflect the presence of riskier banks. Third, the interbank market 
may break down when the dispersion of risk is high. Liquidity rich banks prefer to 
hoard liquidity instead of lending it out to an adverse selection of borrowers. Finally, 
it is possible that even riskier borrowers find the unsecured interest rate too high and 
prefer to obtain liquidity elsewhere. Moreover, when the dispersion of risk is high, 
multiple equilibria are possible and which regime occurs depends on self-fulfilling 
expectations. 
We provide an explanation for observed developments in the interbank market 
before and during the 2007-09 financial crisis, in particular for dramatic increases of 
unsecured interest rates and excess reserves banks hold. Interbank interest rates 
suddenly increased in August 2007. At that time, subprime-mortgage backed 
securities were discovered in portfolios of banks and bank-sponsored conduits (SIVs) 
leading to a reassessment of risk. The extent of exposures was unknown and 
counterparties could not distinguish safe from risky banks. In the context of our 
model, the rise in the interest rate can be attributed either to an increase in the 
perceived dispersion of risk, or to a deterioration in the underlying level of risk, or a 
combination of the two. Interbank rates rose to record-high levels and trading activity 
declined significantly following the dramatic events surrounding the last weekend of 
September 2008, when the financial crisis spread outside the realm of investment 
banking and into the global financial system. These events can be interpreted as a 
further increase in the level and, importantly, in the dispersion of counterparty risk 
that could lead to liquidity hoarding by banks. Asymmetric information as an 
underlying friction can also rationalize the prolonged nature of interbank market 
tensions despite unprecedented interventions by public authorities designed to relieve 
them. 7
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Neither the recent massive money injections, the coordinated lowering of interest rates
nor the use of public funds to recapitalize banks have done much to restart interbank
lending. This action did not solve the underlying problem preventing interbank lending:
extreme information asymmetry.
Financial Times, November 9, 2008
1 Introduction
Interbank markets play a key role in banks￿liquidity management and the transmission of monetary
policy. They provide benchmark rates for the pricing of ￿xed-income securities throughout the
economy (e.g. LIBOR). In normal times, interbank markets are among the most liquid in the
￿nancial sector. Since August 2007, however, the functioning of interbank markets has become
severely impaired around the world. As the ￿nancial crisis deepened in September 2008, liquidity
in the interbank market has further dried up as banks preferred hoarding cash instead of lending
it out even at short maturities. Central banks￿massive injections of liquidity did little to restart
interbank lending. The failure of the interbank market to redistribute liquidity has become a key
feature of the 2007-09 crisis (see, for example, Allen and Carletti, 2008, and Brunnermeier, 2009).
Figure 1 illustrates the unprecedented extent of the turbulence. It plots the spread between
the three-month unsecured rate and the overnight index swap in three months￿time,1 a standard
measure of interbank market tensions (red line), and the amounts of excess reserves banks hold
with the European Central Bank (light and dark blue bars).2 A notable feature is the build up of
tensions in the interbank market. Until August 9, 2007, the unsecured euro interbank market is
characterized by a very low spread, around ￿ve basis points, and in￿nitesimal amounts of excess
reserves with the European Central Bank (ECB). In normal times, banks prefer to lend out excess
cash since the interest rate on excess reserves is punitive relative to rates available in interbank
markets. The turmoil phase between August 9, 2007 and the last weekend of September 2008
1The overnight index swap is a measure of what the market expects the overnight unsecured rate to be over a
three-month period and thus controls for interest rate expectations.
2Banks can hold excess reserves with the European Central Bank in two ways. First, they can access the deposit
facility, which is a standing facility available for banks on a continuous basis for overnight deposits. These are
renumerated at a punitive rate, usually 100 basis points below the policy rate. Second, the ECB occasionally o⁄ers
banks to deposit funds for a short period of time at the policy rate (liquidity-absorbing ￿ne tuning operations).8
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Fine tuning (liq. absorbing)
Figure 1: Interbank spread and excess reserves (recourses to the ECB deposit facility and liquidity-absorbing
￿ne tuning operations), daily average per week, 01/2007 - 04/2009
is characterized by a signi￿cantly higher spread, yet excess reserves remain virtually nil.3 As of
September 28, 2008, the spread increases even further to a maximum of 186 basis points. But
the distinguishing feature of this crisis phase is a dramatic increase in excess reserves. Banks are
hoarding liquidity. At the same time, the average daily volume in the overnight unsecured interbank
market halved.4 A similar pattern of three distinct phases can be observed in the spread for the
United States (Figure 2).5
What caused the interbank market to seize up? Why has the market been dysfunctional for
so long despite massive interventions by public authorities? What frictions can explain these
developments and how do they relate to the broader roots of the ￿nancial crisis? And how do
the policy responses that were discussed or implemented around the world hold up against these
frictions?
This paper provides a model of how the risk of banks￿long-term assets can lead to the evapora-
tion of liquidity in the unsecured interbank market. The key friction in the model is counterparty
risk. Asymmetric information ampli￿es the friction. We use the model to understand the qualita-
3Except a year-end e⁄ect whereby the ECB helps banks to balance their books at the end of every year.
4We examine the events of September and October 2008 in more detail in Section 5.
5Unlike in Europe, we do not have daily information on the evolution of excess reserves in the US as the Federal
Reserve did not renumerate them until late in the crisis.9
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Figure 2: Interbank spreads US and euro area, 01/2007 - 04/2009
tive developments prior to and during the ￿nancial crisis, and to shed light on policy responses. We
model banks as maturity transformers that face a trade-o⁄ between liquidity and return. Banks
trade in the interbank market to smooth out idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. Lending banks face
counterparty risk stemming from the risk of borrowing banks￿assets. Each bank knows the distri-
bution of risk in the banking sector and is privately informed about the risk of its own assets but
banks cannot observe the risk of their counterparties.
Various interbank market regimes arise depending on the level and distribution of counterparty
risk. First, when the level and dispersion of risk are low, the unsecured interbank market functions
smoothly despite counterparty risk and asymmetric information. The interest rate for unsecured
loans is low and all banks manage their liquidity using the interbank market. Riskier banks exert
an externality on safer banks as the latter subsidize the liquidity of the former. But the cost is
small compared to the cost of obtaining liquidity outside the unsecured market. Second, for higher
levels of risk there can be adverse selection in the interbank market. The externality on safer banks
is so costly that they leave the unsecured market. Liquidity is still traded but the interest rate
rises to re￿ ect the presence of riskier banks. Third, the interbank market may break down when
the dispersion of risk is high. Liquidity rich banks prefer to hoard liquidity instead of lending it
out to an adverse selection of borrowers. Finally, it is possible that even riskier borrowers ￿nd10
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the unsecured interest rate too high and prefer to obtain liquidity elsewhere. Moreover, when the
dispersion of risk is high, multiple equilibria are possible and which regime occurs depends on
self-ful￿lling expectations.
The outcomes of our model resemble the observed three phases in Figure 1: i) normal times,
ii) turmoil with elevated spreads but no excess reserves, and iii) crisis with a further increase in
spreads and substantial excess reserves. The points of transition across the phases are in line with
changes in the level and distribution of counterparty risk: a market-wide reassessment of risk in the
summer of 2007, after subprime-mortgage backed securities were discovered in portfolios of banks
and bank-sponsored conduits, and a further dramatic revision of expected default probabilities
following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Asymmetric information as an underlying friction can
also rationalize the prolonged nature of interbank market tensions despite an unprecedented level
of liquidity provision by central banks.
Our modeling assumptions are designed to re￿ ect the insights from broad analyses of the 2007-
09 ￿nancial crisis. First, asymmetric information about the size and location of risk, and the
accompanying fear of counterparty default, which was created by the complexity of securitization,
are at the heart of the ￿nancial crisis (see Gorton, 2008, 2009). Second, maturity mismatch is a
key factor contributing to the fragility of modern ￿nancial systems that can become clogged by
illiquid securities (see, for example, Diamond and Rajan, 2009a, and Brunnermeier, 2009). Hence,
we employ a version of the standard model of banking introduced by Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
that allows for a trade-o⁄ between the liquidity of and the return on assets. Banks may need to
realize cash quickly due to demands of customers who draw on committed lines of credit or on
their demandable deposits. Banks in need of liquidity can borrow from banks with a surplus of
liquidity as in Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) and Bhattacharya and Fulghieri (1994).6 We allow
for banks￿pro￿table but illiquid assets to be risky. Asset risk implies counterparty risk in the
interbank market since banks may not be able to repay their loan.7 Asymmetric information about
counterparty risk ampli￿es the frictions in the interbank market as suppliers of liquidity who cannot
distinguish safer and riskier banks protect themselves against lending to ￿lemons￿ .
6An important complement to liquidity within the ￿nancial sector is the demand and supply of liquidity within
the real sector (see Holmstr￿m and Tirole, 1998).
7Our model therefore applies to money market segments in which credit risk concerns play a role, namely unsecured
(term) markets and markets secured by risky collateral.11
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The e⁄ects of private information on the functioning of debt markets were ￿rst examined by
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). In their analysis banks with market power do not raise the interest
rate to clear away an excess demand for loans since they fear being left with an adverse selection
of borrowers. In our analysis, the interbank market is perfectly competitive and banks are price
takers. Liquidity hoarding may occur precisely when liquidity rich banks face an adverse selection of
borrowers and the interest rate is high.8 Broecker (1990) and Flannery (1996) examine a situation
in which banks do not know their competitors￿underwriting abilities. Each bank fears a winner￿ s
curse, i.e., lending to borrowers who have been rejected elsewhere. To protect themselves, banks
only lend at high rates. Freixas and Holthausen (2005) show how the integration of interbank
markets may fail when cross-border information about banks is less precise than home-country
information.
Asymmetric information between short-term and long-term investors is a key friction in Bolton,
Santos, and Scheinkman (2009). Longer-term investors, as potential buyers of assets, do not know
whether short-term investors sell because the asset failed to produce a return or because they need
liquidity and the asset has not yet matured. Delaying the sale deepens the information problem and
adverse selection may ine¢ ciently accelerate asset liquidation. They distinguish between outside
and inside liquidity (asset sales versus cash), which connects to our analysis where banks hold liquid
and illiquid securities and the former can be traded in exchange for risky claims on the latter.
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) distinguish between market liquidity and funding liquidity. In
our model, banks can obtain funding liquidity in the interbank market by issuing claims on assets
with limited market liquidity.
In Diamond and Rajan (2009b), illiquidity can depress lending and low prices for illiquid assets
go hand in hand with high returns on holding liquidity. They do not consider asymmetric informa-
tion. Instead, potential buyers may want to wait for asset prices to decline further. At the same
time, the managers of selling banks may want to gamble for resurrection. These two e⁄ects feed on
each other and may lead to a market freeze.
Allen, Carletti, and Gale (2009) present a model of a repo market freeze without asymmetric
information or counterparty risk. Banks can stop trading due to aggregate liquidity risk, i.e.
8In this sense our paper is also related to Myers and Majluf (1984). Our outcome in which lenders face an adverse
selection of borrowers and the interest rate is high is comparable to their outcome in which investors face an adverse
selection of equity issuing ￿rms and the stock price is low.12
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banks hold similar rather than o⁄setting positions. Aggregate shortages are also examined in
Diamond and Rajan (2005) where bank failures can be contagious due to a shrinking of the pool
of available liquidity. Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000) analyze systemic risk and contagion in a
￿nancial network and its ability to withstand the insolvency of one bank. In Allen and Gale (2000),
the ￿nancial connections leading to contagion arise endogenously as a means of insurance against
liquidity shocks.
Rationales for central bank intervention in the interbank market are studied in Acharya, Gromb,
and Yorulmazer (2008) and Freixas, Martin, and Skeie (2009). In Acharya et al., market power
makes it possible for liquidity rich banks to extract surplus from liquidity poor banks. A central
bank provides an outside option for the banks su⁄ering from such liquidity squeezes. In Freixas et
al., multiple equilibria exist in interbank markets, some of which are more e¢ cient than others. By
steering interest rates, a central bank can act as a coordination device for market participants and
ensure that a more e¢ cient equilibrium is reached. Freixas and Jorge (2008) examine how ￿nancial
imperfections in the interbank market a⁄ect the monetary policy transmission mechanism beyond
the classic money channel. Bruche and Suarez (2009) explore implications of deposit insurance and
spatial separation for the ability of money markets to smooth out regional di⁄erences in savings
rates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model setup.
In Section 3, we analyze the benchmark case in which there is no asymmetric information about
counterparty risk. In Section 4, we analyze the case in which there is asymmetric information. In
Section 5, we discuss the empirical implications of the model and relate them to the developments
during the ￿nancial crisis. In Section 6, we employ the model to discuss policy responses. In Section
7, we o⁄er concluding remarks. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The model
There are three dates, t = 0;1; and 2, and a single homogeneous good that can be used for
consumption and investment. There is no discounting and no aggregate uncertainty.
Banks. There is a [0;1] continuum of identical, risk neutral banks. Banks manage the funds
on behalf of risk neutral customers with future liquidity needs. To meet the liquidity needs of13
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customers, banks o⁄er them claims worth d1 and d2 that can be withdrawn at t = 1 and t = 2,
respectively, e.g. demand deposits or lines of credit. We assume that the liquidity needs are strictly
positive at each date so that d1 > 0 and d2 > 0.
The aggregate demand for liquidity is certain: a fraction ￿ of customers withdraws their claims
at t = 1: The remaining fraction 1 ￿ ￿ withdraws at t = 2. At the individual bank level, however,
the demand for liquidity is uncertain. A fraction ￿h of banks face a high liquidity demand ￿h > ￿
at t = 1 and the remaining fraction ￿l = 1 ￿ ￿h of banks faces a low liquidity demand ￿l < ￿.
Hence, we have ￿ = ￿h￿h + ￿l￿l: Let the subscript k = l;h denote whether a bank faces a low or
a high need for liquidity at t = 1. We assume that banks￿idiosyncratic liquidity shocks are not
contractible. A bank￿ s liabilities cannot be contingent on whether it faces a high or a low liquidity
shock at t = 1 and t = 2: This will give rise to an interbank market.
Assets and banks￿portfolio decision. At t = 0, banks can invest in two types of real
assets, a long-term illiquid asset and a short-term liquid asset. We assume that each bank has one
unit of the good under management at t = 0. Each unit invested in the short-term asset o⁄ers
a return equal to 1 after one period (costless storage). Each unit invested in the long-term asset
yields an uncertain payo⁄ at t = 2. The long-term asset can either succeed and return R or fail
and generate a loss Z ￿ 0. We assume that the loss is high enough to render a bank insolvent in
which case its liabilities are assumed by the regulator. To prevent any risk-shifting behavior due
to limited liability, the regulator dictates the structure of banks￿liabilities, i.e. he imposes d1 and
d2.9 Banks must honor their liabilities as long as they are solvent. Given d1 and d2, banks choose
their portfolio of short-term and long-term assets to maximize pro￿ts. Let ￿ denote the fraction
invested in the long-term asset at t = 0. The remaining fraction 1￿￿ is invested in the short-term
asset.
Banks are uncertain about the riskiness of their long-term investment when they make their
portfolio choice at t = 0. With probability q, the long-term investment succeeds with probability
ps and with probability 1 ￿ q, it succeeds with probability pr < ps.10 Let p denote the expected
success probability: p ￿ qps + (1 ￿ q)pr. Each bank becomes privately informed about the risk
of its long-term investment at t = 1. While the overall level of risk, p, is known, banks have
9The regulator sets d1 and d2 such that banks are solvent as long as their long-term asset succeeds.
10This is a simple case of the monotone likelihood ratio property, see, for example, La⁄ont and Martimort (2002),
p.164.14
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private information whether their long-term investment is safer, ps > p, or riskier, pr < p, than
expected. The uncertainty about the risk of the long-term asset is assumed to be independent
of the uncertainty about liquidity demand. Let the subscript ￿ = s;r denote whether a bank￿ s
long-term asset is safer or riskier than expected.
The investment in the long-term asset is ex ante e¢ cient: pR > 1. This does not, however,
preclude a long-term investment that turns out to be riskier than expected to be unpro￿table ex
post: prR < 1. Any fraction ￿L of the long-term investment can be converted into liquidity at
t = 1 using a private liquidation technology that yields a constant unit return of less than one
(costly liquidation). We interpret this broadly as a cost of accessing sources of funding other
than unsecured borrowing. We assume that safer investments are easier to convert into liquidity,
1 > ls > lr. This structure makes riskier assets also more illiquid, a feature particularly pronounced
in the current crisis.11 Our results would be qualitatively unchanged if we instead assumed that the
safer long-term asset returns less than the riskier asset, Rs < Rr, and that both types of long-term
assets can be converted into liquidity at the same rate, ls = lr = l. We show this in Appendix B.
What matters is that the opportunity cost of liquidation, R
l , is higher for a riskier bank.
In case the riskier investment is unpro￿table ex post, prR < 1, we will assume that prR > lr so
that banks prefer to keep long-term investment to maturity even if it turns out to be riskier than
expected. In sum, banks face a trade-o⁄ between liquidity and return when making their portfolio
11This would be the case if the liquidation technology realizes a constant fraction ￿ of the long-term asset￿ s expected
value: l￿ = ￿p￿R.
Figure 3: Assets and ￿nancial claims15
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decision. The long-term asset is ex ante more productive but it is costly to convert it into liquidity
at t = 1.
Interbank market and liquidity management. Given that banks face di⁄ering liquidity
demands at t = 1, an interbank market can develop. Banks with low withdrawals at t = 1 can lend
any excess liquidity to banks with high withdrawals. Let Ll and Lh denote the amount lent and
borrowed, respectively, and let r denote the interest rate on interbank loans.12
Due to the risk of the long-term asset, borrowers as well as lenders in the interbank market
may be insolvent at t = 2 when the loan repayment is due. Solvent borrowers must always repay
their interbank loans. If their lender is insolvent, the repayment goes to the regulator. In contrast,
solvent lenders are only repaid if their borrowers are solvent, too. Hence, lenders in the interbank
market are exposed to the possibility that their loans are not repaid, i.e. they are exposed to
counterparty risk. We denote the probability that an interbank loan is repaid by ^ p.
We assume that the interbank market is competitive, i.e. banks act as price takers, and that
banks are completely diversi￿ed across interbank loans. Hence, ^ p is also the proportion of interbank
loans made by a lender that will be repaid at t = 2.
In sum, a bank can manage its liquidity at t = 1 in three ways: 1) by borrowing/lending in the
interbank market, 2) by converting the long-term asset into liquidity, and 3) by investing in the
short-term asset for another period.
The sequence of events is summarized in Figure 4.
3 Benchmark: No asymmetric information
In this section we assume that the shock to the risk of the long-term asset at t = 1, ￿ = fs;rg,
is publicly observable. This case provides a useful benchmark in order to evaluate the impact
of asymmetric information later on. We proceed backwards by ￿rst examining banks￿liquidity
management at t = 1 and then considering banks￿portfolio choice at t = 0. Since the risk of banks￿
long-term assets is publicly known, there will be two interbank markets: one for safer borrowers,
￿ = s, and one for riskier borrowers, ￿ = r. We denote the gross interest rate in each market by
1 + r￿:
12The screening of borrowers is not possible in this set-up as all banks demand the same loan size and there is no
readily available collateral they can pledge.16
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-
time t=0 t=1 t=2
Banks o⁄er demandable
deposits (d1;d2).
Banks invest into a risky
illiquid and a safe liquid as-
set.
Idiosyncratic liquidity shocks
and shocks to the risk of the
illiquid investment realized.
Banks borrow and lend in an
interbank market at an interest
rate r.
Additionally, they can convert
part of the illiquid asset into
liquidity and/or reinvest into
the liquid asset.
A proportion of customers
withdraws deposits d1.
The return of the illiquid
asset realizes.





Figure 4: The timing of events
Having received the liquidity shock, k = fl;hg, and the shock to the risk of their long-term
asset, ￿ = fs;rg, banks manage liquidity at t = 1 in order to maximize expected pro￿ts at t = 2
while taking their asset allocation (￿;1￿￿) as given. A bank that received a high liquidity shock,
type-(h;￿), has a liquidity shortage at t = 1. It can obtain liquidity by borrowing an amount Lh;￿
in the interbank market and by liquidating a fraction ￿L
h;￿ of its long-term investment. It can also
reinvest a fraction ￿R
h;￿ of its liquidity in the short-term asset. The optimization problem at t = 1







h;￿(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿L
h;￿￿l￿) ￿ (1 + r￿)Lh;￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿h)d2] (1)
subject to the resource constraint
￿hd1 + ￿R
h;￿(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿L
h;￿￿l￿) ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ + ￿L
h;￿￿l￿ + Lh;￿ (2)
and the feasibility constraints Lh;￿ ￿ 0, 0 ￿ ￿L
h;￿ ￿ 1, 0 ￿ ￿R
h;￿ ￿ 1.
With probability p￿ a bank is solvent at t = 2 and its pro￿ts are composed of: 1) the return
on its long-term investments, i.e., R per unit invested and not liquidated; 2) the proceeds from
reinvesting into the short-term asset; minus 3) the repayment of the interbank loans plus interest;
and 4) the payout to t = 2 customers. With probability 1 ￿ p￿ a bank is insolvent and is taken17
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over by the regulator. As it is protected by limited liability, its pro￿ts are zero in this case. The
resource constraint requires that the out￿ ow of liquidity at t = 1 (withdrawals and reinvestment
into the short-term asset) be matched by the in￿ ow (return on the short-term asset, proceeds from
liquidation, and the amount borrowed).
A bank that received a low liquidity shock, type-(l;￿), has a liquidity surplus. It can lend to
safer and riskier banks in the interbank market (an amount Ls
l;￿ and Lr
l;￿, respectively), reinvest in
the short-term asset (fraction ￿R
l;￿ of its liquidity) and liquidate part of its long-term asset (fraction
￿L













subject to the resource constraint
￿ld1 + ￿R
l;￿(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿L
l;￿￿l￿) + Ls
l;￿ + Lr
l;￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ + ￿L
l;￿￿l￿ (4)
and the feasibility constraints Ls
l;￿ ￿ 0, Lr
l;￿ ￿ 0, 0 ￿ ￿L
l;￿ ￿ 1, 0 ￿ ￿R
l;￿ ￿ 1.
The key di⁄erence between (1) and (3) is that a bank with a liquidity surplus is exposed to
counterparty risk when lending in the unsecured interbank market. A lender who is fully diversi￿ed
across interbank loans of type ￿ collects the repayment on just a fraction ^ p￿ of his interbank loan
portfolio since some borrowers are insolvent at t = 2. The di⁄erence between (2) and (4) is that
the amounts lent in the interbank market appear as out￿ ows in the resource constraint of a bank
with a liquidity surplus.
Banks￿liquidity management at t = 1 determines at which interbank interest rates i) banks
with a liquidity surplus are willing to lend and ii) banks with a liquidity shortage are willing to
borrow.
Proposition 1 (Liquidity management, no asymmetric information) Banks with a liquid-
ity surplus are willing to lend to type-(h;￿) banks (those with a liquidity shortage) if and only if the
interbank interest rate r￿ satis￿es:
1
^ p￿
￿ 1 + r￿: (5)
Suppose that banks with a liquidity surplus are willing to lend. Then type-(h;￿) banks borrow in the18
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1126
December 2009
interbank market if and only if the interbank interest rate r￿ satis￿es:




The lower bound on the interest rate 1 + r￿ is given by the participation constraint of banks
with a liquidity surplus. Their outside opportunity is to reinvest in the short-term asset. If the
expected return on risky lending, ^ p￿(1 + r￿), is lower than the riskless return on the short-term
asset, then banks with a liquidity surplus do not lend in the unsecured interbank market.
The upper bound is given by the participation constraint of banks with a liquidity shortage.
Their outside opportunity to borrowing in the interbank market is to convert part of their long-term
asset into liquidity. The opportunity cost is the foregone return on the long-term asset, R, times
the illiquidity premium, 1
l￿. If the interest rate is too high, then banks with a liquidity shortage do
not borrow in the unsecured interbank market.
The participation constraint of banks with a liquidity surplus does not depend on the risk of
their own long-term asset. It only depends on the counterparty risk of unsecured lending. In
contrast, the participation constraint of banks with a liquidity shortage depends on the type of
their long-term investment: The opportunity cost of liquidating is lower for the safer long-term
asset.13
We concentrate on the case in which all banks manage their liquidity in the unsecured interbank
market. Proposition 1 determines a range of feasible interest rates:
1
^ p￿




The following corollary to Proposition 1 characterizes banks￿liquidation and reinvestment de-
cisions at t = 1 when all banks participate in the interbank market.
Corollary 1 If all types (k;￿) of banks manage their liquidity at t = 1 using the interbank mar-
ket, then they do not reinvest in the short-term asset and they do not liquidate their long-term
13The opportunity cost is determined by
R
l . Hence, it is not essential whether the return R or liquidation value l is
type-speci￿c. An alternative set-up with the same liquidation proceeds ls = lr = l and type-speci￿c returns Rs < Rr,
with ps > pr (safer asset succeeds more often but returns less) would also deliver the prediction that the opportunity




l . The participation decisions would be unchanged. See
Appendix B for a detailed derivation of this alternative set-up.19
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A bank with a liquidity shortage that participates in the interbank market ￿nds the cost of
liquidation too high (equation 6) and does not liquidate. Moreover, borrowing and reinvesting
in the short-term asset is not pro￿table. The cost of borrowing is larger than the bene￿t of
reinvesting. This is because 1 + r￿ > ^ p￿(1 + r￿) ￿ 1 where the latter inequality holds since banks
with a liquidity surplus participate in the interbank market. Similarly, a bank with a liquidity
surplus that participates in the interbank market prefers not to reinvest in the short-term asset
(equation 5). Moreover, the expected return on risky lending is not high enough to warrant the
costly liquidation of the long-term asset by lenders. If banks with a liquidity shortage prefer not
to liquidate, then banks with a liquidity surplus do not liquidate either: ^ p￿(1 + r￿) < 1 + r￿ ￿ R
l￿
where the latter inequality holds since banks with a liquidity shortage participate in the interbank
market.
At t = 0 banks make their portfolio choice ￿. When making the choice, they take the price
of unsecured interbank loans, 1 + r￿, as given. The price in turn must be consistent with banks￿
portfolio choice. Banks will not invest everything in the short-term asset nor will they invest
everything in the long-term asset. The pro￿tability of the long-term asset, pR > 1, implies that
￿ < 1. The need to meet withdrawals at t = 1, d1 > 0, implies that ￿ > 0.
Suppose that all banks manage their liquidity at t = 1 using the interbank market. In this case,
an interior portfolio allocation ￿ solves
max
0<￿<1
￿lp[R￿ + ^ ps(1 + rs)Ls
l + ^ pr(1 + rr)Lr
l ￿ (1 ￿ ￿l)d2] (8)




l = 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ld1 (9)
Lh = ￿hd1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿): (10)
Banks are identical at t = 0 since the shocks to liquidity and to the riskiness of the long-term asset
have not yet materialized. The objective function of banks at t = 0 is therefore the expectation20
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over k = fl;hg and ￿ = fs;rg of their objective function at t = 1. The optimization problem makes
use of Corollary 1. When all banks manage their liquidity using the interbank market, then there
is no liquidation and no reinvestment in the short-term asset at t = 1. Banks￿resource constraints
are binding. Type-(h;￿) banks borrow the entire liquidity shortfall and type-(l;￿) banks lend their
entire liquidity surplus. Since the risk of a bank￿ s long-term asset does not a⁄ect the amount it
borrows or lends, we drop the subscript ￿ from Lh;￿, Ls
l;￿ and Lr
l;￿.
When both safer and riskier banks with a liquidity shortage borrow in the interbank markets,
then banks with a liquidity surplus must expect the same return from lending to each type of
borrower (see the proof of Proposition 1 for the formal derivation):
^ ps(1 + rs) = ^ pr(1 + rr): (11)
Since lenders hold a fully diversi￿ed portfolio of interbank loans, the proportion of loans to type-
(h;￿) banks that will be repaid is given by the proportion of type-(h;￿) banks that are solvent at
t = 2:
^ p￿ = p￿: (12)
The following Proposition states the interbank interest rates that are consistent with an interior
portfolio allocation at t = 0:
Proposition 2 (Pricing of liquidity) If all types (k;￿) of banks manage their liquidity using
the interbank market, then the interest rate for unsecured loans to type-(h;￿) banks is








where p ￿ qps + (1 ￿ q)pr is the expected probability that the long-term asset succeeds.
The interest rate, i.e., the price of liquidity traded in the unsecured interbank market, is e⁄ec-
tively given by a no-arbitrage condition. Equation (13) can be written as
(￿lpp￿ + ￿hp￿)(1 + r￿) = pR: (14)
The right-hand side is the expected return from investing an additional unit into the long-term asset.21
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At t = 0, banks expect their long-term asset to succeed with probability p. The left-hand side is
the expected return from investing an additional unit into the short-term asset. With probability
￿h, a bank will have a liquidity shortage at t = 1. One more unit of the short-term asset saves on
borrowing at an expected cost of p￿(1 + r￿); where p￿ is the probability that a borrower of type ￿
has to repay his loans. With probability ￿l, a bank will have a liquidity surplus. One more unit of
the short-term asset can be lent out at an expected return pp￿(1 + r￿). A lender receives the loan
repayment only when both he and his counterparties are solvent, which occurs with probability
pp￿.
We can write (13) as:













denotes a common premium on risky interbank debt. Lenders require a compensation for counter-
party risk. The premium ￿ is ￿common￿since it depends only on the average success probability
of the long-term asset, p. The price of liquidity is adjusted downwards for safer borrowers since
p
ps < 1. Conversely, it is adjusted upwards for riskier borrowers since
p
pr > 1.
The next proposition shows when the pricing of liquidity (15) is consistent with the range of
feasible interest rates (7).
Proposition 3 (No asymmetric information) When the risk of the long-term asset is publicly
observable and all banks manage their liquidity in the interbank market, the adjusted premium on







Banks with a liquidity shortage will borrow in the interbank market only if the premium on
risky interbank debt - adjusted for their observable risk - is smaller than the illiquidity premium.
Banks with a liquidity surplus, however, are always willing to lend since
ps (1 + rs) = pr (1 + rr) =
pR
￿
> pR > 1:22
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The amounts invested in the short-term and long-term asset are determined by market clearing





l = ￿h (1 ￿ q)Lh:
Using (9) and (10), market clearing yields:
1 ￿ ￿ = ￿d1: (17)
The amount invested in the short-term asset exactly covers the amount of expected withdrawals.
The interbank market fully smoothes out banks￿idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, k = fl;hg.
Banks￿expected pro￿ts when everybody participates in the interbank market are given by (using
(13) and (17)):
￿(d1;d2) = p[R(1 ￿ ^ ￿d1) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)d2]; (18)
where ^ ￿ ￿ ^ ￿l￿l + ^ ￿h￿h, ^ ￿l ￿
p
￿￿l, and ^ ￿h ￿ 1
￿￿h (note that ^ ￿l + ^ ￿h = 1).
In order to give an interpretation for this expression, it is useful to ￿rst consider the case when
there is no counterparty risk, p￿ = 1, i.e. when the long-term investment is safe. Without coun-
terparty risk, banks with a shortage of liquidity are always willing to participate in the interbank
market as well. There is no premium on interbank debt, ￿ = 1. The condition in Proposition
3 reduces to l￿ ￿ 1, which is always satis￿ed since liquidation is costly. Banks￿expected pro￿ts
without counterparty risk are
￿￿(d1;d2) = R(1 ￿ ￿d1) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)d2: (19)
Banks invest as much as possible in the pro￿table long-term asset provided that they are able
to satisfy average withdrawals at t = 1, ￿ = 1 ￿ ￿d1 < 1. The interbank market smoothes out the
idiosyncratic deviations in withdrawals. Banks keep the return from the long-term asset, R(1￿￿d1),
minus average withdrawals at t = 2, (1 ￿ ￿)d2.23
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Comparing the pro￿ts in (19) with those in (18) shows that the risk of the long-term asset
reduces banks￿pro￿ts. More risk not only makes it less likely that the bank survives, but it also
makes it more expensive to smooth out the liquidity shocks in the unsecured interbank market
since lenders must be paid a premium. It is as if banks needed to hold more liquidity in order to
satisfy higher average withdrawals at t = 1, ^ ￿ > ￿.
4 Asymmetric information
In this section we assume that the shock to the risk of the long-term asset at t = 1, ￿ = fs;rg is
privately observed. While each bank gets to know the risk of its own long-term investment after
it chose its portfolio, banks no longer know the risk type of their counterparty when they borrow
and lend in the unsecured interbank market. As before, we solve the model backwards by ￿rst
examining banks￿liquidity management at t = 1 and then their portfolio choice at t = 0.
We derive di⁄erent regimes in the unsecured interbank market under asymmetric information.
First, there can be full participation of all banks in the market. Second, there can be adverse
selection when safer banks with a liquidity shortage prefer not to borrow in the unsecured interbank
market. Third, the market can break down. The break down can occur because banks with a
liquidity surplus prefer to hoard liquidity instead of lending it out or because no bank wants to
borrow anymore.
4.1 Liquidity management







h;￿(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿L
h;￿￿l￿) ￿ (1 + r)Lh;￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿h)d2]: (20)
The di⁄erence compared to the objective function of a type-(h;￿) bank in the benchmark case
(equation (1)) is that the interest rate r can no longer be indexed by the type ￿ since the risk of
the long-term asset is not publicly observable.24
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l;￿(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿L
l;￿￿l￿) + ^ p(1 + r)Ll;￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿l)d2]: (21)
The di⁄erence to the objective function of a type-(l;￿) bank in the benchmark case (equation
(3)) is the expected loan repayment. A bank with a liquidity surplus can no longer distinguish
between safer and riskier borrowers. Neither the amount lent, Ll;￿, nor the interest rate r, nor the
expected fraction of repaid loans, ^ p, can be indexed by the risk type of borrowers (the ￿ in the
subscript of L denotes the risk type of lenders).
The changes in the objective function of banks at t = 1 with asymmetric information lead to
the following analogue of Proposition 1:
Proposition 4 (Liquidity management under asymmetric information) Banks with a liq-
uidity surplus are willing to lend if and only if the interbank interest rate r satis￿es:
1
^ p
￿ 1 + r: (22)
Suppose that banks with a liquidity surplus are willing to lend. Then type-(h;￿) banks borrow in the
interbank market if and only if the interbank interest rate r satis￿es:




As in the case without asymmetric information, the lower bound on the interest rate is given by
the participation constraint of banks with a liquidity surplus while the upper bound is given by the
participation constraint of banks with a liquidity shortage (see Proposition 1). The key di⁄erence
is that the interest rate r and counterparty risk p are no longer indexed.
Proposition 4 implies that there are four possible outcomes: i) all banks participate in the
unsecured interbank market; ii) all banks with a liquidity surplus and riskier banks with a liquidity
shortage participate; iii) banks with a liquidity surplus do not participate; and iv) banks with
liquidity shortage do not participate. In the following sections, we analyze each of the four cases.25
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4.2 Regime 1: Full participation of all banks
In order to derive the interest rate and characterize the regime with full participation of all banks
in the interbank market (Regime 1), we start by assuming that there is indeed full participation
and then derive the parameter restrictions this entails.
Let r1 denote the interest rate in Regime 1. According to Proposition 4, the interest rate must
lie in the following interval when all banks manage their liquidity in the interbank market:
1
^ p




The upper bound is determined by safer banks with a liquidity shortage since they have a lower
opportunity cost of liquidation than riskier banks. Analogous to the benchmark case, the next
result follows directly from Proposition 4 and characterizes banks￿liquidation and reinvestment
decisions at t = 1 in Regime 1.
Corollary 2 If all types (k;￿) of banks manage their liquidity at t = 1 using the interbank market,




Let ￿1 denote the fraction that banks invest in the long-term asset at t = 0. As in the
benchmark case, banks take the price of unsecured interbank loans as given when choosing their
portfolio. When all banks manage their liquidity using the the interbank market, ￿1 solves:
max
0<￿1<1
￿l (qps + (1 ￿ q)pr)[R￿1 + ^ p(1 + r1)Ll ￿ (1 ￿ ￿l)d2] (25)
+ ￿h (qps + (1 ￿ q)pr)[R￿1 ￿ (1 + r1)Lh ￿ (1 ￿ ￿h)d2]
subject to
Ll = 1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿ld1 (26)
Lh = ￿hd1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿1) (27)
where we have used Corollary 2. The change relative to the benchmark case without asymmetric
information is that there is now a single interbank market for all borrowers￿risk types.26
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The ￿rst-order condition for a bank￿ s optimal portfolio allocation across the short-term and
long-term assets requires that:
(￿lp^ p + ￿hp)(1 + r1) = pR (28)
where p ￿ qps + (1 ￿ q)pr. As in (14), the interbank interest rate r1 is given by a no-arbitrage
condition. The right-hand side is the expected return from investing an additional unit into the
long-term asset, pR. The left-hand side is the expected return from investing an additional unit
into the short-term asset that can either be lent out or saves on borrowing. Lenders expect to
receive the loan repayment with probability ^ p. Banks￿own ex-ante probability of being solvent at
t = 2, p, a⁄ects the expected return of both the short-term and the long-term asset and therefore
cancels out.
Given that all banks with a liquidity shortage borrow in the interbank market, lenders expect
the proportion of repaid interbank loans or, equivalently, the probability of loan repayment to be
equal to the expected proportion of solvent banks at t = 2:
^ p = p (29)
where p ￿ qps + (1 ￿ q)pr.
Using (16), (28), (29) and Proposition 4, we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 5 (Regime 1) Under asymmetric information about the risk of the long-term asset,
if all banks manage their liquidity in the interbank market, the interest rate is given by




and the common premium for risky interbank debt is smaller than the illiquidity premium for the
safer long-term asset, 1
￿ ￿ 1
ls.
The interest rate in Regime 1 is determined solely by the common premium for risky interbank
debt, 1
￿, in contrast to the interest rates in the benchmark case without asymmetric information
(equation (15)). It is no longer possible to adjust for the risk type ￿ of borrowers. Safer borrowers27
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pay a higher interest rate compared to the benchmark whereas riskier borrowers pay a lower rate:
rs < r1 < rr:
Riskier borrowers exert an externality on safer borrowers in Regime 1 since the latter subsidize the
former.
As in the benchmark case, banks with a liquidity surplus are always willing to lend when all
banks participate in the interbank market since p(1 + r1) =
pR
￿ > 1. As long as the common
premium for risky interbank debt is not too high, all banks with a liquidity shortage prefer to
borrow. As the premium becomes higher, the ￿rst borrowers to drop out of the interbank market
are the safer ones (Corollary 4). Hence, Regime 1 ceases to be an equilibrium when 1
￿ > 1
ls.
Asymmetric information shrinks the set of parameters for which all banks manage liquidity
in the interbank market. Suppose full participation in the interbank market is an equilibrium in





ls holds (Proposition 3). If, however, 1
￿ > 1
ls holds, then full
participation is not an equilibrium under asymmetric information (Proposition 5).
Since all banks manage their liquidity in the interbank market in Regime 1, the amounts invested
in the short-term and long-term asset (1 ￿ ￿1;￿1) are as in the benchmark case. Market clearing
in the interbank market, ￿lLl = ￿hLh, yields
1 ￿ ￿1 = ￿d1 (31)
where we have used (26) and (27). The amount invested in the short-term asset exactly covers the
amount of expected withdrawals. Using the interest rate (30) and the portfolio choice (31), we can
also show that banks￿expected pro￿ts in Regime 1 are the same as in the benchmark case (18),
￿1(d1;d2) = ￿(d1;d2).
In sum, there is no impairment to market functioning in Regime 1 despite asymmetric infor-
mation. All banks manage their liquidity in the unsecured interbank market and there is no costly
liquidation of the long-term asset. Banks￿portfolio allocation and expected pro￿ts are the same as
in the benchmark case. Asymmetric information, however, shrinks the set of parameters for which
all banks participate in the market. It therefore ampli￿es the fundamental friction in the model,28
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i.e., counterparty risk of unsecured interbank lending.
4.3 Regime 2: Adverse selection in the interbank market
The previous section showed that asymmetric information shrinks the set of parameters for which
all banks manage their liquidity in the interbank market. Safer banks with a liquidity shortage may
￿nd the mispricing caused by the riskier borrowers too large, i.e. the interest rate too high, relative
to the cost of obtaining liquidity outside the unsecured market. Lenders then face an adverse
selection of riskier borrowers. We follow the same steps as in the previous sections. We start by
assuming that there is adverse selection in the interbank market (Regime 2) and then derive the
parameter restrictions this entails.
When banks with a liquidity surplus lend to an adverse selection of riskier banks, then Propo-
sition 4 speci￿es the following range for the interbank interest rate r2:
1
^ p






< 1 + r2: (33)
The interest rate must be high enough for banks with a liquidity surplus to be willing to lend and
for safer banks with a liquidity shortage not to be willing to borrow. At the same time, the interest
rate must be low enough so that riskier banks with a liquidity shortage prefer to borrow.
The next result characterizes banks￿liquidation and reinvestment decisions at t = 1.14
Corollary 3 If all banks except safer banks with a liquidity shortage manage their liquidity using
the interbank market, then no bank reinvests in the short-term asset: ￿R
k;￿ = 0. Banks with a
liquidity surplus and riskier banks with a liquidity shortage do not liquidate: ￿L
l;￿ = ￿L
h;r = 0. Safer
banks with a liquidity shortage liquidate part of their long-term asset in order to satisfy withdrawals
at t = 1: ￿L
h;r > 0.
Let ￿2 denote the fraction that banks invest in the long-term asset at t = 0. When banks expect
14Under adverse selection, it may be the case that safer banks with a liquidity surplus liquidate their long-term
asset in order to pro￿t from lending at high rates, in particular at rates such that pr (1 + r2) >
R
ls. This case,
however, rules out liquidity hoarding, which we document in Figure 1 (since pr (1 + r2) >
R
ls > 1, see Section 4.4 for
details). Hence, it does not seem relevant for the 2007-09 crisis. We proceed under the assumption that lenders do
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adverse selection in the interbank market at t = 1, their portfolio choice ￿2 solves:
max
0<￿2<1
￿lp[R￿2 + ^ p(1 + r2)Ll ￿ (1 ￿ ￿l)d2] (34)
+￿hqps[R￿2(1 ￿ ￿L
h;s) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿h)d2]
+￿h(1 ￿ q)pr[R￿2 ￿ (1 + r2)Lh;r ￿ (1 ￿ ￿h)d2]
subject to
Ll = 1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ld1
Lh;r = ￿hd1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)
￿L
h;s￿2ls = ￿hd1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)
where we have used Corollary 3.
In contrast to Regime 1 (full participation), a safer bank with a liquidity shortage no longer
borrows in the interbank market and instead liquidates part of its long-term asset. This occurs
with probability ￿hqps. Instead of interbank loans Lh the liquidation proceeds ￿L
h;s￿2ls have to
make up for the shortfall in liquidity at t = 1.
The ￿rst-order condition for an optimal portfolio allocation under adverse selection is:
￿lp^ p(1 + r2) + ￿h
￿





One more unit of the short-term asset saves a bank with a liquidity shortage the cost of borrowing,
1 + r2, or liquidation, R
ls. The return on the short-term asset for a bank with a liquidity surplus
depends on the level of counterparty risk, i.e., the probability of not being repaid 1￿ ^ p. Since only
riskier banks borrow, the level of counterparty risk is higher than under full participation:
^ p = pr < p:30
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We can rewrite condition (35) to obtain the interbank interest rate in Regime 2:




















The premium is higher than in the full participation case, 1
￿2 > 1
￿, since counterparty risk is higher
under adverse selection.
Using (36), we can write the condition that safer banks with a liquidity shortage drop out of







A necessary condition for adverse selection in the interbank market to be an equilibrium is that the
premium for risky interbank debt under adverse selection is higher than the illiquidity premium
for the safer long-term asset. Condition (33) also implies that the equilibrium interest rate with
adverse selection is indeed higher than with full participation (see condition (24)):
1 + r2 >
R
ls
￿ 1 + r1:














A necessary condition for riskier banks with a liquidity shortage to borrow in the interbank market
(i.e. for the upper bound to hold) is that the premium for risky interbank debt under adverse
selection is smaller than the illiquidity premium for the riskier long-term assets, 1
￿2 < 1
lr.
Unlike in the case of full participation, banks with a liquidity surplus may not want to lend
since their participation constraint (the lower bound in (38)) is no longer satis￿ed automatically.
A su¢ cient condition for their participation constraint to hold is that the expected return on the31
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riskier long-term asset is larger than the cost of liquidation for the safer long-term asset, prR > ls.15
The following proposition summarizes the results:
Proposition 6 (Regime 2) If there is adverse selection in the unsecured interbank market, i.e.
safer banks with a liquidity shortage do not borrow, the interbank interest rate is given by (36) and
conditions (37) and (38) hold.
The set of parameters for which conditions (37) and (38) hold is non-empty: lr < ls and the
lower bound of (38) involves R, which is not present in the upper bound of (38) or in (37).
The amounts invested in the short-term and long-term asset are determined by market clearing
in the interbank market, ￿lLl = ￿h (1 ￿ q)Lh;r:
￿2 = 1 ￿ d1(~ ￿l￿l + ~ ￿h￿h) (39)
where ~ ￿l ￿
￿l
￿l+￿h(1￿q) > ￿l and ~ ￿h ￿
￿h(1￿q)
￿l+￿h(1￿q) < ￿h (note that ~ ￿l + ~ ￿h = 1). Since ￿l < ￿h,
we have ￿2 > ￿1. Banks choose a less liquid portfolio when they expect adverse selection in the
interbank market since fewer banks will demand liquidity in the interbank market.
When compared to full participation, adverse selection in the interbank market: i) leads to a
higher interest rate for unsecured interbank loans, ii) may lead to a binding participation constraint
for banks with a liquidity surplus, and iii) has banks choose a less liquid portfolio ex ante. Moreover,
it may lead to lower expected bank pro￿ts:
Proposition 7 (Bank pro￿ts under adverse selection) Adverse selection leads to lower ex-




Note that if all banks participate in the interbank market in the benchmark case of full infor-
mation, the condition above is always satis￿ed (see Proposition 3). Moreover, a simple su¢ cient
condition for pro￿ts under adverse selection to be lower is ls ￿ ps. The condition is therefore
satis￿ed if safer banks succeed with high probability.
15Sicne condition (37) must hold under adverse selection, we have ls ￿ ￿h
qps




prR < 1 is
su¢ cient for the lower bound of (38) to hold.32
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4.4 Breakdown of the interbank market
Figure 1 showed that as of the end of September 2008 banks seemed to be hoarding liquidity. In the
context of our model, banks always prefer to lend out any excess liquidity in the full participation
regime (Regime 1). The interest rate, 1+r1 = R
￿ , is high enough for banks with a liquidity surplus
to prefer lending in the interbank market to reinvesting in the short-term asset. But liquidity
hoarding becomes possible once safer banks with a liquidity shortage drop out of the interbank
market. Although the interest rate increases to re￿ ect the higher counterparty risk, the increase
need not be large enough to compensate lenders for lending to an adverse selection of borrowers.
When the interest rate under adverse selection is such that
pr(1 + r2) < 1; (40)
then banks with a liquidity surplus prefer to reinvest in the short-term asset, i.e., to hoard liquidity.
Substituting for the interest rate from (36) and using the fact that adverse selection requires 1
￿2 > 1
ls,
a necessary condition for liquidity hoarding is
prR < ls: (41)
Since ls < 1, lenders only hoard liquidity if the riskier long-term investment turns out to be
unpro￿table. Note that (41) is compatible with the assumption about the ex ante e¢ ciency of the
long-term investment, pR > 1.
Liquidity hoarding leads to a breakdown of the interbank market since banks with a liquidity
surplus no longer lend. But the market can also break down if banks with a liquidity shortage no
longer borrow. We established that safer banks stop borrowing at lower rates than riskier banks
causing adverse selection in the interbank market. But even riskier banks may choose to leave the
unsecured market segment if adverse selection drives up the interest rate too much. This occurs
when





Working Paper Series No 1126
December 2009







i.e., the premium for risky interbank debt under adverse selection is higher than the illiquidity
premium for the riskier long-term asset.
4.5 Multiple equilibria
We use the conditions derived in the previous sections to discuss the possibility of multiple equilibria
in the interbank market. We provide proofs of the statements below in the Appendix.







The condition is equivalent to 1+r2 ￿ R
ls where r2 is the interest rate under adverse selection (see
equation (36)). If the interest rate that would arise under adverse selection is relatively low, safer
borrowers prefer to stay in the market and hence Regime 2 cannot be an equilibrium.






and (38) holds. The condition is equivalent to R
ls < 1 + r1 where r1 is the interest rate under full
participation. In this case, Regime 1 is not an equilibrium since the interest rate is too high for
safer borrowers to participate in the interbank market.
Liquidity hoarding is the unique equilibrium if and only if 1
ls < 1
￿ and the lower bound in (38)
is violated. Similarly, no borrowing is the unique equilibrium if and only if 1
ls < 1
￿ and the upper
bound in (38) is violated.
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Both full participation and adverse selection in the interbank market coexist as equilibria if
conditions (42) and (38) hold. If banks expect full participation in the interbank market, the
resulting gross interest rate 1+r1 is smaller than R
ls, which justi￿es banks￿expectations. However,
if banks expect adverse selection in the interbank market, the gross interest rate is 1+r2, which is
larger than R
ls. Safer banks with a liquidity shortage drop out of the interbank market and banks￿
expectations are justi￿ed.
Both full participation and liquidity hoarding are equilibria when condition (42) holds and the
lower bound in (38) is violated. Similarly, full participation and no borrowing coexist when (42)
holds and the upper bound in (38) is violated.
The possibility of multiple equilibria creates scope for policy interventions that coordinate banks￿
expectations. We discuss this further in Section 6.2.
5 Discussion and empirical implications
Depending on parameters, three di⁄erent outcomes are possible in our model: i) full participation
and no impairment to the functioning of the interbank market, ii) adverse selection and higher
interest rates, and iii) market breakdown. Figure 5 shows which outcome occurs under di⁄erent
values for the average success probability, p, and the dispersion of risk, ￿p ￿ ps ￿ pr. Since banks
have private information about the risk of the illiquid asset, ￿p is a measure of the severity of the
asymmetric information problem.
When the average level of counterparty risk is low (high p), full participation is always an
equilibrium in the interbank market. It is the unique equilibrium as long as the dispersion of risk
is low as well. Asymmetric information about the risk of long-term assets does not impair the
functioning of the interbank market in this case. However, an increase in the dispersion of risk
alone, without an increase in the level of risk, leads to the full participation equilibrium coexisting
with the adverse selection equilibrium (for intermediate dispersion levels) or with liquidity hoarding
(for high dispersion levels). Hence, expectations start to matter and can be self-ful￿lling.
If average counterparty risk is higher but dispersion remains low, adverse selection arises as the
unique equilibrium. Safer banks with a liquidity shortage ￿nd the interest rate in the interbank
market too high and prefer to obtain liquidity outside the unsecured interbank market. Only an35
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adverse selection of riskier banks keeps borrowing unsecured, causing the interest rate to increase.
When higher average counterparty risk is combined with high dispersion, liquidity hoarding ensues.
Lenders prefer to keep liquidity instead of lending it out despite the high rates borrowers would be
willing to pay. Finally, when both the level and the dispersion of risk are high, the market breaks
down because no bank wants to borrow.
The di⁄erent outcomes in our model, i) no impairment, ii) adverse selection, and iii) liquidity
hoarding, resemble three phases described in Figure 1: i) normal times, ii) turmoil with elevated
spreads but no excess reserves, and iii) crisis with a further increase in spreads and substantial excess
reserves. Interbank interest rates suddenly increased in August 2007. At that time, subprime-
mortgage backed securities were discovered in portfolios of banks and bank-sponsored conduits
(SIVs) leading to a reassessment of risk. The extent of exposures was unknown and counterparties
could not distinguish safe from risky banks. In the context of our model, the rise in the interest rate
can be attributed either to an increase in the perceived dispersion of risk, or to a deterioration in the
underlying level of risk, or a combination of the two. Interbank rates rose to record-high levels and
trading activity declined signi￿cantly following the dramatic events surrounding the last weekend
of September 2008, when the ￿nancial crisis spread outside the realm of investment banking and
Figure 5: Equilibrium outcomes as a function of the level and dispersion of counterparty risk (drawn
for the following parameter values: R = 1:5, q = 0:66, ￿l = 0:3, ls = 0:95, lr = 0:3)36
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into the global ￿nancial system.16 These events can be interpreted as a further increase in the level
and, importantly, in the dispersion of counterparty risk making the adverse selection problem more
severe.17 Moreover, one can view the e⁄ect of the rescue of Bear Stearns as initially placing a lower
bound on the perceived probability of default of counterparties. But letting Lehman fail led to a
drastic revision of expected default probabilities.
Since the possibility of a market breakdown due to liquidity hoarding by lenders is an important
feature of our model, we examine the empirical evidence more closely. The major developments at
the end of September are depicted in relation to ￿ ows and stocks of liquidity using daily data in
Figures 6 and 7. Excess reserves start rising after the collapse of Washington Mutual, ten days after
the Lehman failure (September 15, 2008). Importantly, the rise precedes the ECB announcement
of a change in its liquidity provision policy on October 8, 2008.18 In the week of September 29,
2008, the daily amounts of excess reserves averaged more than e169 billion (Figure 6).
At exactly the same time as excess reserves rose, the average daily volume in the overnight
unsecured interbank market (Eonia) halved and the net amount of central bank liquidity outstand-
ing dropped signi￿cantly (Figure 7).19 The net amount of central bank liquidity outstanding is
the total stock of liquidity provided minus the amount absorbed in all open market operations
and recourses to the standing facilities. The Figures show that although the ECB provided large
amounts of liquidity (see the spikes in the net stock of liquidity) throughout September 2008, banks
were not holding excess reserves until the end of the month. Moreover, there is evidence that the
set of banks holding excess reserves is not the same as the set of banks borrowing from the ECB. It
16Before the weekend of September 27-28, 2008 Washington Mutual, the largest S&L institution in the US was
seized by the FDIC and sold to JPMorgan Chase. At the same time, negotiations on the TARP rescue package
stalled in US Congress. Over the weekend, it was reported that British mortgage lender Bradford & Bingley had
to be rescued and Benelux announced the injection of e11.2 billion into Fortis Bank. On the following Monday,
Germany announced the rescue of Hypo Real Estate, and Iceland nationalized Glitnir.
17The fact that banks no longer trust each other amid perceptions that other banks are at risk of default was also
pointed out by market commentators at the time, see, for example, ￿Central Banks Add Funds to Money Markets,￿
The Wall Street Journal, September 29, 2008 and ￿Why the ECB Can￿ t Fix Europe,￿Business Week, October 8,
2008.
18As of October 9, the deposit facility rate was increased from 100 to 50 basis points below the policy rate, thus
making deposits relatively more attractive. Moreover, as from the operation settled on October 15, 2008, the weekly
main re￿nancing operation was carried out through a ￿xed rate tender procedure with full allotment at the policy
rate. Previously, banks had to bid demand schedules given an announced aggregate allotment.
19At the onset of the crisis in August 2007, the Eonia saw an increase in volume. The average daily volume was
e40.91 billion in the year prior to August 9, 2007. It increased by 27%, to an average of e52.12 billion, between
August 9, 2007 and September 26, 2008. This increase could re￿ ect a substitution towards more short-term ￿nancing
in the interbank market in Regime 2 as liquidity in longer-term segments of the market dried up. The drop in
overnight volumes of more than e29 billion observed at the end of September 2008 is thus even more dramatic.37
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25.8. 1.9. 8.9. 15.9. 22.9. 29.9. 6.10.13.10.20.10.27.10.3.11.
3m Euribor - 3m Eonia swap
Recourse to deposit facility
Fine tuning (liq. absorbing)
Figure 6: Interbank spread and excess reserves (recourses to the ECB deposit facility and liquidity-absorbing
￿ne tuning operations), 08/2008 - 11/2008
follows that, as of the last weekend of September 2008, banks were hoarding liquidity and parking
it as excess reserves rather than lending it out.
If the interbank market su⁄ers from liquidity hoarding, two further implications follow from
our model. First, a necessary condition for liquidity hoarding is that some banks are insolvent,
i.e. prR < 1 (as implied by (41)). Tackling the roots of the problem therefore requires ￿nding out
who these banks are and recapitalizing (or closing) them. Indeed, the US government and banking
regulators were assessing banks￿risk and viability through a comprehensive ￿stress testing￿exercise
as of February 25, 2009. Second, increasing the rate at which excess reserves are renumerated
reinforces liquidity hoarding. To see this, consider an increase in the right-hand side of (40) from
1 to 1 + ￿, where ￿ is the interest earned on excess reserves. After making excess reserves more
attractive by increasing the deposit facility rate from 100 to 50 basis points below the policy rate
on October 9, 2008, the ECB lowered it back to 100 basis points on January 21, 2009.
Our model suggests that interbank interest rates can rise due to adverse selection. Safer banks
leave the unsecured market since they have better alternatives for obtaining liquidity than riskier
banks. This is consistent with anecdotal evidence about the reluctance of banks to borrow at high
rates since the onset of the crisis in order to avoid ￿signaling￿that they are bad banks. Moreover,
there is evidence of ￿tiering￿ in interbank markets consistent with our model where di⁄erences38
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Net stock of liquidity outstanding
Eonia volume
Figure 7: Net stock of central bank liquidity outstanding (left scale) and overnight unsecured market
volumes (right scale), 08/2008 - 11/2008
in the risk of banks￿long-term assets translates into di⁄erences in their alternatives to unsecured
borrowing. With the onset of the ￿nancial crisis in August 2007, the spread between the rate in
the interbank market secured by government bonds (Eurepo) and the rate of secured borrowing
in ECB auctions rose signi￿cantly. Banks with high quality collateral could borrow more cheaply
than banks bidding in the ECB auctions where a larger set of collateral is accepted (Tapking and
Weller, 2008).
Prior to September 2008 and in light of committed credit lines to SIVs, aggregate liquidity
risk was also suggested as a reason for the high level of interbank rates.20 However, aggregate
liquidity risk by itself cannot explain why banks with su¢ cient liquidity refused to lend funds in
the market even at short maturities. Moreover, since the ECB moved to fully satisfy banks￿demand
for liquidity against a wide set of collateral and committed itself to uphold the full allotment for a
considerable amount of time, concerns about aggregate liquidity shortages are greatly reduced (see
also Taylor, 2009).
20A number of studies assess the relative importance of credit and liquidity risk in interbank interest rate spreads
(see, for example, Taylor and Williams, 2009, and Schwarz, 2009). Acharya and Merrouche (2008) establish a causal
link between aggregate liquidity held by large settlement banks in the UK and interest rates in secured and unsecured
interbank markets.39
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6 Policy responses
The aim of this section is to shed light on some of the policy responses that were discussed or
implemented in order to relieve the tensions observed in interbank markets since August 2007. We
examine ￿ve responses through the lens of our model: market transparency, liquidity requirements,
central bank liquidity provision, loan guarantees, and asset purchases.
6.1 Transparency
Asymmetric information about the riskiness of the illiquid asset is at the heart of the adverse
selection problem in our model. Safer borrowers subsidize riskier ones since lenders cannot tell
them apart.
A natural regulatory response is therefore to improve transparency in the banking sector.21
If, for example, bank supervisors could assess banks￿risk and communicate it to the market, then
lenders would be able to distinguish safer and riskier borrowers, as in our benchmark model without
asymmetric information. Two markets would emerge, one for riskier banks with an interest rate
rr, and one for safer banks with an interest rate rs, with rs < rr (see Proposition 2).22
Transparency could ensure that safer borrowers remain in the interbank market while they
would drop out in its absence. In particular, if 1
ls < 1
￿ holds, then full participation is not an
equilibrium under asymmetric information (Proposition 5). However, it can be an equilibrium







In the wake of the ￿nancial crisis, bank regulators are investigating a strengthening of liquidity
requirements. These requirements are supposed to ensure that ￿nancial institutions are able to
withstand liquidity stresses of varying magnitude and duration.
21Increased transparency is a key recommendation of the de LarosiŁre report, which examines the organization of
supervision of ￿nancial institutions and markets in the EU. Similar recommendations are made by the UK￿ s Turner
Review and the Group of 30 Report by Paul Volcker.
22Assessing banks￿risk is indeed the aim of the ￿stress testing￿ exercise undertaken by the US government and
banking regulators (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2009). Such an exercise can also help to
restore normal trading conditions in the interbank market by reducing the degree of asymmetric information, ￿p.
Moreover, it can help to bring back the supply of funds that withdrew in fear of lending to unpro￿table ￿lemons￿
(see equation (41)). Either the regulator is able to ￿nd out which bank is unpro￿table and close it down, or it can
convince market participants that there are no such banks around.40
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In our model, requiring banks to hold a certain amount of liquidity can also act as a coordination
device when multiple equilibria in the interbank market are possible. Full participation is not a
unique equilibrium when ￿ ￿ ls > ￿2. A regulator can ensure full participation and a low interest
rate in the interbank market if he requires banks to hold the following amount of liquidity at t = 0:
1 ￿ ￿1 = ￿d1:
This amount is a higher than the one that banks would choose if they anticipated adverse selection,
￿1 < ￿2 (see Section 4.3).
6.3 Liquidity provision by the central bank
A central bank can o⁄er to provide liquidity directly to banks in need. Indeed, increased liquidity
provision was a common reaction by central banks around the world to the 2007-2009 ￿nancial
crisis.23
Suppose that an unanticipated adverse shock to counterparty risk, p, moves the economy from
full participation to adverse selection.24 Assuming that a central bank has no informational advan-
tage over the market, it has to o⁄er liquidity to all banks at the same rate, rCB. The highest rate
at which safer banks are willing to borrow from the central bank is:




23At the onset of the crisis on 9 August 2007, when overnight rates temporarily spiked up by 60 basis points, the
Eurosystem provided e94 billion of liquidity via collateralized, overnight lending. From August 2007 until September
2008, the Eurosystem was able to stabilize the overnight interbank rates without increasing the aggregate supply
of liquidity by adjusting the time path of its liquidity provision (￿frontloading￿ liquidity within each maintenance
period). From October 2008, it introduced a full allotment procedure in its market operations which led to a signi￿cant
increase in the liquidity provision. As a result, the size of the ECB￿ s balance sheet temporarily increased by roughly
e600 billion. The Federal Reserve introduced the Term Auction Facility (TAF), which allowed the auctioning of term
funds to all depository institutions. In early 2009, the outstanding volume in the TAF was almost $500 billion, and
the total short-term liquidity provided by the Federal Reserve to ￿nancial institutions totalled around $850 billion
(Bernanke 2009).
24Since we assume that the shock to counterparty risk is unanticipated, the regulatory response to the crisis is also
unexpected. Thus, we abstract from moral hazard issues that can be an important consideration when examining
policy responses to crises (for a recent analysis see, e.g., Diamond and Rajan, 2009c).41
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which is positive since pR > 1 > ls. Even though the central bank lends at a subsidized rate,
it makes a pro￿t. The reason is that a central bank can raise liquidity at unit cost. That is, it
can ￿print money￿ . In contrast, the private supply of liquidity is costly since banks have to forgo
investing in the long-term asset if they want to be able to provide liquidity at t = 1. Moreover,
banks have to bear liquidity and counterparty risk. Condition (30) shows that the cost of private
liquidity is R
￿ > R > 1:
If a central bank provides liquidity to banks with a liquidity shortage, it crowds out the private
supply of liquidity. Banks with excess liquidity are no longer able to ￿nd a counterparty. In order
to have a more balanced intervention, the central bank can o⁄er to take on the excess liquidity and,
possibly, o⁄er a return on it. The central bank would e⁄ectively become an intermediary. It would
be the counterparty for all liquidity transactions and replace the interbank market.25
A central bank can always provide liquidity at a lower cost than the interbank market. This is
true even without a crisis. While such an intervention may seem desirable ex post (thus disregarding
any moral hazard issues), it can have substantial costs ex ante. One important consideration is the
role of interbank markets in information aggregation, price discovery, and peer monitoring (see, for
example, Rochet and Tirole, 1996).
6.4 Interbank loan guarantees
Several countries have introduced loan guarantees in order to revive the interbank market.26 De-
pending on their scope, loan guarantees reduce or even eliminate counterparty risk, thus lowering
the interbank interest rate and inducing safer banks to borrow again.
Consider ￿rst the case of full interbank loan guarantees. Counterparty risk is eliminated and all
25See also Buiter (2008). As of October 15, 2008 the ECB was de facto intermediating: it fully satis￿ed demand
for liquidity in its weekly Main Re￿nancing Operations and, at the same time, banks deposited signi￿cant amounts
with the ECB (see also the discussion in section 5).
26One example is Italy, where the Banca d￿ Italia and the owners of the e-Mid trading platform have established
the Mercato Interbancario Collateralizzato (MIC). Even though its trading activity is in principle collateralized, the
Banca d￿ Italia guarantees timely repayment of all loans in MIC. The reason is that the crisis also a⁄ected secured
interbank lending as there were credit risk concerns due to uncertain collateral values.42
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banks participate in the interbank market. The interest rate in the interbank market is 1+rFG = R,
where rFG denotes the interest rate under full guarantees. The cost of this intervention to the
guarantor is
p(1 + rFG)￿hLh ￿ (1 + rFG)￿hLh
or, equivalently,
￿R￿hLh (1 ￿ p): (43)
The guarantor has to pay for all losses due to the risk of the illiquid investment.
Consider next partial guarantees that increase the probability of repayment from p to ~ p, where
~ p is high enough to guarantee full participation in the interbank market:




and where rPG is the interest rate under partial loan guarantees.27 The cost to the guarantor is:





￿hLh (~ p ￿ p): (44)
The following proposition shows that interbank loan guarantees should be su¢ ciently compre-
hensive to be cost-e¢ cient for the public sector.
Proposition 8 (Partial guarantees) The cost of partial guarantees that yield an interest rate
just ensuring full participation, 1 + rPG = R
ls, always exceeds the cost of full guarantees.
A guarantee covers both principal and interest. While a partial guarantee reduces the cost on
the principal it increases the cost on the interest as the interest rate rises to compensate lenders
for the remaining counterparty risk.
27To ensure that lenders are willing to lend, the guarantee must be su¢ ciently high: ~ p(1 + rPG) > 1.43
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6.5 Asset purchases
An alternative to borrowing in the interbank market is to convert the risky long-term asset into
liquidity. One way to do this is to acquire high quality collateral that can be used in the repo
market or with central banks. Selling long-term assets is costly in the context of our model, l￿ < 1.
In a ￿nancial crisis, this cost is particularly acute due to ￿￿re-sale￿prices. If banks bring more
long-term assets to the market than there are funds available to buy them, the market will be
characterized by ￿cash-in-the-market pricing￿ . In other words, long-term assets are particularly
subject to market liquidity risk (as in, for example, Shleifer and Vishny, 1992, Allen and Gale,
2004, or Gorton and Huang, 2004).
A central bank or a government authority does not face liquidity risk. Since liquidity risk does
not need to be priced in, they can o⁄er to buy long-term assets from banks at a higher price,
P > l￿.28;29 The price only needs to re￿ ect the credit risk of assets. Moreover, by setting the price
appropriately, the central bank or government can attract both safer and riskier borrowers and take
advantage of pooling assets.
In particular, the price P could be set equal to the expected return on the long-term asset, pR.
This ensures that the central bank or government does not su⁄er losses on average. Such pricing
e⁄ectively lowers the opportunity cost of liquidity to 1. This is bene￿cial for borrowers who would
otherwise have to pay a premium for obtaining liquidity in the interbank market since they have
to compensate lenders for counterparty risk.
7 Conclusion
Interbank markets underwent dramatic changes during the ￿nancial crisis of 2007-09, with interest
rates rising to previously unseen levels and trading activity declining signi￿cantly in some market
segments. Unsecured, longer-term interbank lending and lending secured with risky collateral were
particularly a⁄ected. Motivated by these facts, we present a model of the interbank market in
28The Eurosystem has for example widened the set of eligible collateral for its re￿nancing operations. While the
Federal Reserve cannot purchase assets other than Treasuries, agencies and agency MBS, the US government is
purchasing assets via the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). For an analysis of how the availability of collateral
a⁄ects money markets see, for example, Heider and Hoerova (2009).
29For an analysis of public interventions to alleviate debt overhang among private ￿rms when the government has
limited information and limited resources see Philippon and Schnabl (2009).44
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which lenders are exposed to counterparty risk. We show that depending on parameters, re￿ ecting
in particular the level and distribution of risk among banks, an equilibrium in which all banks
participate in the interbank market and in which liquidity is reallocated smoothly may not be
reached. The functioning of the interbank market can be impaired by adverse selection, possibly
leading to a market breakdown. The interbank market regimes obtained in the model echo the
developments prior to and during the ￿nancial crisis.
Although a number of factors a⁄ect banks￿decisions to trade in interbank markets, our model
highlights the role of counterparty risk as an important ingredient to explain the observed events.
At the same time, asymmetric information about risk can rationalize the prolonged nature of
interbank market tensions despite an unprecedented liquidity provision by central banks. We use
the model to shed light on various policy responses that were put in place to relieve the tensions.
The model can be extended along a number of dimensions. In particular, potential spill-overs
between the secured and unsecured money market segments can be examined. What led to the
signi￿cant degree of interbank market segmentation during the crisis? What determines the will-
ingness of banks to pay at central bank re￿nancing operations? How broad should the list of eligible
collateral be? These questions are left for future research.45
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
At t = 1, type-(l;￿) banks solve (3) subject to (4) and the following feasibility constraints:
Ls




















where the corresponding Lagrange multipliers are in square brackets. Let ￿
l;￿
1 be the Lagrange
multiplier on the resource constraint (4).
Type-(h;￿) banks solve (1) subject to (2) (with Lagrange multiplier ￿
h;￿
1 ) subject to the following
feasibility constraints:

























2 = 0 (A.3)

















4 = 0 (A.5)
￿











6 = 0 (A.6)
Similarly, the ￿rst-order conditions for a type-(h;￿) bank are given by:

















4 = 0 (A.8)











6 = 0 (A.9)
We proceed in a number of steps. We ￿rst derive the marginal value of liquidity in the interbank
market.
Lemma A.1 The marginal value of liquidity for a type-(l;￿) bank that o⁄ers funds to safer borrow-
ers, Ls
l;￿ > 0, is ￿
l;￿
1 = p￿^ ps(1 + rs) and for a type-(l;￿) bank that o⁄ers funds to riskier borrowers,
Lr
l;￿ > 0, it is ￿
l;￿
1 = p￿^ pr(1+rr): The marginal value of liquidity for a type-(h;￿) bank that demands
funds is ￿
h;￿
1 = p￿(1 + r￿):
The Lemma follows from equations (A.3), (A.4) and (A.7) where ￿
l;￿;s




2 = 0 since Lr
l;￿ > 0 and ￿
h;￿
2 = 0 since Lh;￿ > 0: The marginal value of liquidity is lower for a
bank that o⁄ers funds than for a bank that demands funds due to counterparty risk.
The following Corollary follows immediately from Lemma A.1.49
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Corollary A.1 If a type-(l;￿) bank o⁄ers funds to both safer and riskier borrowers, Ls
l;￿ > 0;Lr
l;￿ >
0, then it must make the same expected return on both groups of borrowers, ^ ps(1+rs) = ^ pr(1+rr).
Next, we characterize the decision to o⁄er funds in the interbank market.
Lemma A.2 Type-(l;￿) banks o⁄er funds to safer banks, Ls
l;￿ > 0, and not to riskier banks, Lr
l;￿ =
0, if and only if ^ ps(1 + rs) ￿ 1 > ^ pr(1 + rr). They o⁄er funds to riskier banks, Lr
l;￿ > 0, and not
to safer banks, Ls
l;￿ = 0, if and only if ^ pr(1 + rr) ￿ 1 > ^ ps(1 + rs). They o⁄er funds to both if and
only if ^ ps(1 + rs) = ^ pr(1 + rr) ￿ 1.
We ￿rst show that if Ls
l;￿ > 0 and Lr
l;￿ = 0, then ^ ps(1+rs) ￿ 1 > ^ pr(1+rr). Suppose not. Since
Ls
l;￿ > 0, we have ￿
l;￿




1 ￿ ￿ + ￿L
l;￿￿l￿
￿





We have that 1￿￿+￿L
l;￿￿l￿ > 0 since otherwise the resource constraint cannot hold (Ls
l;￿ > 0 and
d1 > 0). Since we assume ^ ps(1 + rs) < 1, it must be the case that ￿
l;￿
6 > 0 implying ￿R
l;￿ = 1. But
if a lender reinvests all of his liquidity in the short-term asset, he has nothing left to o⁄er in the
interbank market. Again, this contradicts Ls
l;￿ > 0.
We now show that if ^ ps(1 + rs) ￿ 1 > ^ pr(1 + rr), then Ls
l;￿ > 0 and Lr
l;￿ = 0. Suppose not.
Equation (A.6) is then written as:
p￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿L
l;￿￿l￿
￿












We have that 1 ￿ ￿ + ￿L
l;￿￿l￿ > 0 since otherwise the resource constraint is violated (as d1 > 0).
Then, it must be that ￿
l;￿
5 > 0 since all the other terms in the condition are negative. Hence,
￿R
l;￿ = 0. But if a lender does not reinvest his liquidity surplus into the short-term asset, he must
be o⁄ering it in the interbank market since his resource constraint binds (￿
l;￿
1 > 0). It follows that
Lr
l;￿ > 0 and hence ￿
l;￿;r
2 = 0 implying
p￿^ pr(1 + rr) = ￿
l;￿
1
by equation (A.4). Combining with equation (A.3), we get that
p￿^ ps(1 + rs) + ￿
l;￿;s
2 = p￿^ pr(1 + rr)
and hence ^ ps(1 + rs) < ^ pr(1 + rr), a contradiction.
The proof that Lr
l;￿ > 0 and Ls
l;￿ = 0 if and only if ^ pr(1 + rr) ￿ 1 > ^ ps(1 + rs) proceeds
analogously (by simply exchanging the s and r labels above).
We now show that Ls
l;￿ > 0 and Lr
l;￿ > 0 if and only if ^ ps(1 + rs) = ^ pr(1 + rr) ￿ 1. We know
that if Ls
l;￿ > 0 and Lr
l;￿ > 0, then ^ ps(1 + rs) = ^ pr(1 + rr) (Corollary A.1). It remains to show that
^ p￿(1 + r￿) ￿ 1. Suppose not. Using equation (A.6) again, we get that ￿
l;￿
6 > 0 implying ￿R
l;￿ = 1.
This is in contradiction with o⁄ering funds in the interbank market.
Finally, we show that ^ ps(1 + rs) = ^ pr(1 + rr) ￿ 1 implies Ls
l;￿ > 0 and Lr
l;￿ > 0. Suppose not.
Using equation (A.6), we again have that ￿
l;￿
5 > 0 and ￿R
l;￿ = 0. But if a lender does not reinvest
his liquidity surplus into the short-term asset, he must be o⁄ering it in the interbank market since
his resource constraint binds (￿
l;￿
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Note that the decision to o⁄er funds in the interbank market is independent of the risk type ￿




l. Moreover, banks with a liquidity surplus
only o⁄er funds when they are compensated for counterparty risk: r￿ > 0 must hold when ^ p￿ < 1:
Next, we show that if a bank o⁄ers or demands funds in the interbank market, then it does not
reinvest in the short-term asset.
Lemma A.3 If a bank o⁄ers or demands funds in the interbank market, Ls
l > 0, Lr
l > 0 or
Lh;￿ > 0, then it does not reinvest in the short-term asset, ￿R
k;￿ = 0.
Consider ￿rst the case of a bank that demands funds. Since Lh;￿ > 0, we have ￿
h;￿
1 = p￿(1+r￿).
Substituting into (A.9) yields:
p￿
￿







6 = 0: (A.10)
Note that 1￿￿+￿L
h;￿￿l￿ ￿ 0 holds with equality if and only if ￿ = 1 and ￿L
h;￿ = 0. The case ￿ = 1
and ￿L
h;￿ = 0 cannot be optimal since a type-(h;￿) bank would have to ￿nance its entire need for
liquidity by borrowing in the interbank market at a rate 1 + r￿ > 1 whereas it could get liquidity
at unit cost using the short-term asset. Hence, 1￿￿+￿L
h;￿￿l￿ > 0 implying ￿
h;￿
5 > 0 and ￿R
h;￿ = 0.
Next, consider the case of a bank that o⁄ers funds to safer borrowers. Since Ls
l > 0, we have
￿
l;￿
1 = p￿^ ps(1 + rs). Substituting into (A.6) yields:
p￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿L
l;￿￿l￿
￿




6 = 0: (A.11)
Note that 1 ￿ ￿ + ￿L
l;￿￿l￿ > 0 holds since otherwise the resource constraint cannot hold (Ls
l > 0
and d1 > 0). Since ^ ps(1 + rs) ￿ 1 (Lemma A.2 with Ls
l > 0), we have ￿
l;￿
5 > 0 and hence ￿R
l;￿ = 0.
The proof is analogous for a bank that o⁄ers funds to riskier borrowers.
Next, we characterize banks￿decision to liquidate part of the long-term asset when they o⁄er
funds in the interbank market.
Lemma A.4 Suppose a type-(l;￿) bank o⁄ers funds in the interbank market to safer banks, Ls
l > 0.
Then it does not liquidate, ￿L
l;￿ = 0, if and only if ^ ps (1 + rs) ￿ R
l￿. Similarly, suppose a type-(l;￿)
bank o⁄ers funds to riskier banks, Lr
l > 0. Then it does not liquidate, ￿L
l;￿ = 0, if and only if
^ pr (1 + rr) ￿ R
l￿:
Consider ￿rst the case of a bank that o⁄ers funds to safer borrowers, Ls
l > 0 (and hence
￿
l;￿;s
2 = 0). Substituting ￿
l;￿
1 = p￿^ ps (1 + rs) and ￿R
l;￿ = 0 (Lemma A.3) into (A.5) yields:





It must be that ￿ > 0. If not, borrowers will never be able to repay interbank loans, which is
inconsistent with Ls
l > 0. It follows that ￿L
l;￿ = 0 if and only if ^ ps (1 + rs)l￿ ￿ R. The same
argument establishes that ￿L
l;￿ = 0 if and only if ^ pr (1 + rr)l￿ ￿ R when banks o⁄er funds to riskier
borrowers, Lr
l > 0.
Next, we characterize a bank￿ s demand for funds in the interbank market when it is being
o⁄ered funds.
Lemma A.5 Suppose that funds are o⁄ered to a type-(h;￿) bank, L￿
l > 0. Then it demands funds,
Lh;￿ > 0, if and only if 1 + r￿ ￿ R
l￿.51
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We ￿rst show that Lh;￿ > 0 implies 1 + r￿ ￿ R




1 = p￿(1 + r￿) and ￿R
h;￿ = 0 (Lemma A.3) into (A.8) yields:





It must be that ￿ > 0, since otherwise borrowers could never repay interbank loans. Since lenders
would never be repaid, they would not lend, contradicting L￿
l > 0. Since we assume that 1+r￿ > R
l￿,
the ￿rst term on the left-hand side is positive. This implies that ￿
h;￿
4 > 0 and hence ￿L
h;￿ = 1. But
if a borrower fully liquidates the long-term asset and does not reinvest into the short-term asset, he
will never be able to repay the interbank loan. Consequently, a lender would never o⁄er the loan
in the ￿rst place.
We now show that 1 + r￿ < R
l￿ implies that Lh;￿ > 0 (if 1 + r￿ = R
l￿, we assume that Lh;￿ > 0).
Suppose not, i.e. Lh;￿ = 0. It must be that 1 ￿ ￿ + ￿L
h;￿￿l￿ > 0 and ￿R
h;￿ < 1 since d1 > 0 in the
resource constraint. Hence, ￿
h;￿
6 = 0 in equation (A.9) and it must be that ￿
h;￿
1 ￿ p￿ > 0. Hence,
the resource constraint binds and ￿L
h;￿ =
￿hd1￿(1￿￿)
￿l￿ > 0. This implies that ￿
h;￿
3 = 0 in equation
(A.8). It follows from the same equation that
￿p￿R￿ + ￿
h;￿










Using equation (A.7) to substitute for ￿
h;￿
1 and collecting terms, we get











It must be that ￿ > 0. Otherwise a type-(l;￿) bank would not be o⁄ering funds to type-(h;￿)
banks, contradicting L￿
l > 0. Also, we know that ￿R
h;￿ < 1. Hence, it must be that 1 + r￿ ￿ R
l￿,
contradicting 1 + r￿ < R
l￿.
Lemma A.6 Suppose that funds are o⁄ered to a type-(h;￿) bank, L￿
l > 0. If a type-(h;￿) bank
demands funds, Lh;￿ > 0, then it does not liquidate, ￿L
h;￿ = 0:
Using Lemma A.3 and A.5 we write equation (A.8) as





It must be that ￿ > 0, since otherwise borrowers could never repay interbank loans. Since lenders
would never be repaid, they would not lend, contradicting L￿
l > 0. Since 1+r￿ ￿ R
l￿ (Lemma A.5),
the ￿rst term on the left-hand side is negative. This implies that ￿
h;￿
3 > 0 and hence ￿L
h;￿ = 0.
Proof of Corollary 1
It follows Lemma A.3, A.4 in conjunction with equation (7) and Lemma A.6.52
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Proof of Proposition 2
We use the no-arbitrage condition (11) (see Corollary A.1) and equation (12) to write the opti-
mization problem (8) as
max
0<￿<1
￿l(qps +l (1 ￿ q)pr)[R￿ + ps(1 + rs)(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ld1) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿l)d2]
+ ￿hqps[R￿ ￿ (1 + rs)(￿hd1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿h)d2]
+ ￿h(1 ￿ q)pr[R￿ ￿
ps
pr
(1 + rs)(￿hd1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿h)d2]
where we have substituted for Ls
l + Lr
h and Lh using the binding resource constraint. The ￿rst
order condition is
(qps + (1 ￿ q)pr)R ￿ (1 + rs)[￿l(qps + (1 ￿ q)pr)ps + ￿h(qps + (1 ￿ q)ps)] = 0
Rearranging yields equation (13) for safe borrowers (￿ = s). The interest rate for riskier borrowers,
1 + rr, is derived analogously.
Proof of Proposition 3
When all banks manage their liquidity in the interbank market then the interest rate is given by
(15). The lower bound on the interest rate in (7) is always satis￿ed since
ps (1 + rs) = pr (1 + rr) =
pR
￿
> pR > 1:





l￿, which simpli￿es to the condition in the
proposition.
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof is the same as the proof of Proposition 1. The only change is that there is now a single
interbank market for both risk-types of borrowers. Hence, one must replace r￿ with r everywhere.
The ￿rst-order conditions remain otherwise the same, except for the ￿rst-order conditions (A.3)
and (A.4), whereby there is now a single ￿rst-order condition with respect to Ll;￿ ￿ 0:





Proof of Corollary 3
No reinvestment into the short-term asset for banks that participate in the interbank market,
￿R
l;￿ = ￿R
h;r = 0, follows from Lemma A.3 (with the modi￿cation that r￿ is now r2). No reinvestment
into the short-term asset for banks that do not participate in the interbank market, ￿R
h;s = 0, follows
from the following lemma.
Lemma A.7 If a type-(h;￿) bank does not demand funds in the interbank market, Lh;￿ = 0, then
it does not reinvest in the short-term asset, ￿R
h;￿ = 0.53
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We ￿rst show that the resource constraint binds. Suppose not. Then, ￿
h;￿
1 = 0 and we can
write the ￿rst-order condition with respect to ￿R
h;￿ (equation A.9) as






Since 1 ￿ ￿ + ￿L
h;￿￿l￿ > 0 (it cannot be that ￿ = 1 and ￿L
h;￿ = 0: a type-(h;￿) bank cannot satisfy
withdrawals at t = 1 if it does not borrow, invests everything into the long-term asset and does
not liquidate), it must be that ￿
h;￿
6 > 0 and hence ￿R
h;￿ = 1. But then the resource constraint is
￿hd1 < 0, a contradiction. Hence, the resource constraint binds.
Since the bank has a liquidity shortage but does not borrow in the interbank market, it must
liquidate some of its long-term asset in order satisfy the withdrawals at t = 1. Positive liquidation,
￿L
h;￿ > 0, implies ￿
h;￿
3 = 0 and the ￿rst-order condition with respect to ￿L













4 ￿ 0: (A.12)
Note that p￿ < ￿
h;￿
















￿ ￿p￿R￿ + ￿l￿p￿ = p￿￿(l￿ ￿ R) < 0;
contradicting equation (A.12).
We now show that there is no reinvestment, ￿R
h;￿ = 0. Suppose not, ￿R
h;￿ > 0 and hence ￿
h;￿
5 = 0.
The ￿rst-order condition with respect to ￿R
h;￿ (equation A.9) becomes
(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿L
h;￿￿l￿)(p￿ ￿ ￿
h;￿
1 ) ￿ ￿
h;￿
6 = 0: (A.13)
As argued above, 1 ￿ ￿ + ￿L
h;￿￿l￿ > 0 and p￿ < ￿
h;￿
1 . But then, equation (A.13) cannot hold, a
contradiction. Hence, type-(h;￿) bank does not reinvest in the short-term asset, ￿R
h;￿ = 0.
No liquidation by riskier banks with a liquidity surplus, , follows from the participation in the
interbank market of riskier banks with a liquidity shortage (equation (32) and Lemma A.4). No
liquidation by safer banks with a liquidity surplus follows from the condition in the Corollary: ^ p(1+
r2) ￿ R
ls. No liquidation by riskier with a liquidity shortage banks follows from their participation
in the interbank market (Lemma A.6). Safer banks with a liquidity shortage do not borrow in the
interbank market and must therefore liquidate their long-term asset in order to satisfy the resource
constraint at t = 1.
Proof of Proposition 7
Using (39) we can determine the amount that a type-(h;s) bank has to liquidate (from the last





d1(￿h ￿ ~ ￿)
1 ￿ d1~ ￿54
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where ~ ￿ = ~ ￿l￿l + ~ ￿h￿h. Using also (36) and Ll and Lh;r from the other resource constraints in
(34), banks￿expected pro￿ts are
￿2(d1;d2) = ￿lp
"




















d1(￿h ￿ ~ ￿)
1 ￿ d1~ ￿
!



















~ ￿ ￿ ￿l = ~ ￿h(￿h ￿ ￿l)
￿h ￿ ~ ￿ = ~ ￿l(￿h ￿ ￿l)
so that






















The condition that banks￿expected pro￿ts under adverse selection are lower than under full
participation, ￿2(d1;d2)2 < ￿1(d1;d2) = ￿(d1;d2) = p[R(1 ￿ ^ ￿d1) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)d2] then becomes






















^ ￿ ￿ ~ ￿ = ￿l￿h(￿h ￿ ￿l)
1 ￿ p + pq
￿ (￿l + (1 ￿ q)￿h)
;
as well as ~ ￿l ￿
￿l
￿l+￿h(1￿q) and ~ ￿h ￿
￿h(1￿q)
￿l+￿h(1￿q), the condition simpli￿es to
1
￿


















Using ￿2 = pr￿l + ￿h, ￿ = p￿l + ￿h, and qps = p ￿ (1 ￿ q)pr, we rewrite the condition as
1
￿













(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ q)
#
which simpli￿es to







and further to ls <
ps
p ￿ since 0 > ￿p(1 ￿ ￿hq) = ￿h(1 ￿ p(1 ￿ q)) ￿ ￿ > ￿hq ￿ ￿.55
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Proof of Equilibrium Uniqueness
We ￿rst show that if Regime 1 is the unique equilibrium, then 1
￿2 ￿ 1
ls. Suppose, contrary to the
claim, that Regime 1 (full participation of borrowers and lenders) is the unique equilibrium and
1
￿2 > 1
ls. Since Regime 1 is unique, lenders are always willing to participate in the interbank market
and, by Proposition 4, 1 + r ￿ 1
^ p. This rules out liquidity hoarding as an outcome.
Since Regime 1 is unique, borrowers are always willing to participate in the interbank market
and, by Proposition 4, 1+r ￿ R
ls < R
lr. Hence, market breakdown due to the drop-out of borrowers
is not possible and 1+r2 ￿ R




To show su¢ ciency, suppose, contrary to the claim, that 1
￿2 ￿ 1
ls and Regime 1 is not unique.
Suppose that Regime 2 is an equilibrium. Then, 1+r2 > R
ls or, equivalently, 1
￿2 > 1
ls. Contradiction.
The proof that Regime 2 is the unique equilibrium if and only if 1
ls < 1
￿ follows the same steps.
Proof of Proposition 8
Comparing (44) and (43), we see that the cost of partial guarantees exceeds the cost of full guar-
antees if and only if:
ls >
~ p ￿ p
1 ￿ p
:
Since the participation constraint of safe borrowers is binding at the interest rate rPG, we know
that ls = ~ p￿l + ￿h (see Proposition 5). Thus, the condition above can be written as:
~ p￿l + ￿h >
~ p ￿ p
1 ￿ p
;
which simpli￿es to ~ p < 1 and hence the claim in the Proposition follows.56
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Appendix B
In this Appendix, we show that the three regimes in the interbank market under asymmetric
information also arise in a model in which the two types of long-term investments can be converted
into liquidity at the same rate but di⁄er in their long-run returns. That is, we assume that Rs < Rr
and ls = lr = l < 1. We retain the assumption that safer investments are more likely succeed:
ps > p > pr where p ￿ qps + (1 ￿ q)pr. Hence, safer investments are characterized by a lower
long-run return but a higher success probability than riskier investments. We let E [R] denote the
expected t = 2 return on the illiquid investments: E [R] ￿ qpsRs + (1 ￿ q)prRr.
One possible interpretation of the liquidation technology is the ability to recover some of the
original investment made at t = 0. This is costly in that the liquidation return is lower per
unit than the original investment: l <1. By contrast, in the set-up developed above we interpret
the liquidation technology as the ability to gather some of the future return on the long-term
investments (R) already at t = 1. Since psR > prR, we also have ls > lr. Since the long-run
returns are not yet realized, liquidation is costly: ls < 1 and lr < 1.
As before, we solve the model backwards by ￿rst examining banks￿liquidity management at
t = 1 and then their portfolio choice at t = 0.
Liquidity management
Having received liquidity shocks, k = fl;hg, and being privately informed about the risk of their
illiquid investment, ￿ = fs;rg, banks need to manage their liquidity at t = 1. A type-(l;￿) bank
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The ￿rst-order conditions for a type-(l;￿) bank with respect to Ll;￿, ￿L
l;￿, and ￿R
l;￿ are:
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Similarly, the ￿rst-order conditions for a type-(h;￿) bank are given by:































Optimal liquidity management decisions are derived following the same steps as in the proof of
Proposition 1 in Appendix A. It is easy to see that the marginal value of liquidity for a type-(l;￿)
bank that o⁄ers funds in the interbank market, Ll;￿ > 0, is ￿
l;￿
1 = p￿^ p(1 + r) and for a type-(h;￿)
bank that demands funds, Lh;￿ > 0, is ￿
h;￿
1 = p￿(1 + r). Similarly, type-(l;￿) banks o⁄er funds in
the interbank market if and only if ^ p(1 + r) ￿ 1. Suppose that funds are o⁄ered to a type-(h;￿)
bank. Then it demands funds, Lh;￿ > 0, if and only if 1 + r ￿
R￿
l .
As for reinvestment decisions, if a bank o⁄ers or demands funds in the interbank market, then
it does not reinvest in the short-term asset, ￿R
k;￿ = 0. Similarly, if a type-(l;￿) bank o⁄ers funds in
the interbank market, Ll;￿ > 0, then it does not liquidate, ￿L
l;￿ = 0, if and only if ^ p(1 + r) ￿
R￿
l .
Suppose that funds are o⁄ered to a type-(h;￿) bank. If a type-(h;￿) bank demands funds, Lh;￿ > 0,
then it does not liquidate, ￿L
h;￿ = 0:
In sum, it is easy to state the analogue of Proposition 4 in the case with di⁄erent R￿ s:




￿ 1 + r: (B.3)
Suppose that banks with a liquidity surplus are willing to lend. Then type-(h;￿) banks borrow in the
interbank market if and only if the interbank interest rate r satis￿es:




As in the main text, the lower bound on the interest rate is given by the participation constraint
of banks with a liquidity surplus while the upper bound is given by the participation constraint of
banks with a liquidity shortage (see Proposition 4).
Interbank market regimes
Regime 1: Full participation of borrowers and lenders
Suppose there is full participation of borrowers and lenders in the interbank market so that ^ p = p.
As before, let r1 and ￿1 denote the interest rate and portfolio choice in Regime 1, respectively.
The interval of feasible interbank interest rates is (by Result 1):
1
p




where the the upper bound is given by the participation constraint of the safer banks with a liquidity
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Turning to the banks￿optimization problem at t = 0, we have that:
max
0<￿1<1
￿lR￿1 + ￿lp[p(1 + r1)Ll ￿ (1 ￿ ￿l)d2]
+￿hR￿1 ￿ ￿hp[(1 + r1)Lh + (1 ￿ ￿h)d2]
where E [R] ￿ qpsRs + (1 ￿ q)prRr, Ll = 1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿ld1, and Lh = ￿hd1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿1). Taking the
￿rst-order condition with respect to ￿1, we get the analogue of equation (28):
(￿lpp + ￿hp)(1 + r1) = E [R]: (B.5)
The interest rate in Regime 1 is, as before, determined by the no-arbitrage condition.
Using (B.5), (16), and Result 1, we can characterize Regime 1 in terms of the interbank interest
rate and the parameters for which it is an equilibrium.
Result 2 If all banks manage their liquidity in the interbank market, the interest rate is






and the common premium for risky interbank debt, 1
￿ ￿ 1




This condition ensures that the opportunity cost of liquidation for safer borrowers is higher than
the cost of borrowing in the unsecured interbank market. The condition 1
￿ < 1
l, i.e. the common
premium for risky interbank debt is smaller than the illiquidity premium, is either a necessary or
a su¢ cient condition for this to be satis￿ed, depending on whether pRs ? E [R]. Moreover, with





p (compare to Proposition 5).
Regime 2: Adverse selection of borrowers in the interbank market
This is the case in which only riskier banks with a liquidity shortage borrow in the interbank
market while safer banks with a liquidity shortage obtain liquidity outside the unsecured market.
Hence, lenders in the interbank market are exposed to the adverse selection of borrowers and face
counterparty risk ^ p = pr. Let r2 and ￿2 denote the interest rate and portfolio choice in Regime 2,
respectively.
The interval of feasible interbank interest rates is (by Result 1):
1
pr




where the the upper bound is given by the participation constraint of the riskier banks with a
liquidity shortage.
As in the analysis in the main text, there can be two cases in the adverse selection regime: 1)
a case in which none of the lenders convert illiquid investments into liquidity, 1 + r2 ￿ Rs
prl < Rr
prl;
and 2) a case in which safer lenders choose to convert their illiquid investments and to lend excess
liquidity in the interbank market, 1 + r2 > Rs
prl. As before, we will focus on the former case as the
other case does not add any new features to the results. Moreover, it did not seem to play a central
role in the interbank market developments in the 2007-09 crisis. This is because liquidity hoarding,
which we document above, cannot occur in this case: pr (1 + r2) > Rs
l > 1 . We therefore proceed
under the assumption that pr (1 + r2) ￿ Rs
l .59
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At t = 0, banks￿optimization problem is:
max
0<￿2<1








￿ (1 ￿ ￿h)d2
￿
+￿h (1 ￿ q)pr [Rr￿2 ￿ (1 + r2)Lh;r ￿ (1 ￿ ￿h)d2]
where E [R] ￿ qpsRs + (1 ￿ q)prRr, Ll = 1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ld1, Lh;r = ￿hd1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2), and ￿L
h;s =
￿hd1￿(1￿￿2)
￿2l . Taking the derivative with respect to ￿2, we get the analogue of equation (35):
(￿lppr + ￿h (1 ￿ q)pr)(1 + r2) + ￿hqps
Rs
l
= E [R]: (B.8)
We can rewrite condition (B.8) to obtain the interbank interest rate in Regime 2:











￿2 denotes the premium for risky interbank debt under adverse selection, 1
￿2 ￿ 1
￿lpr+￿h.
Using (B.9), we can write the condition that safer banks with a liquidity shortage drop out of







so that 1 + r2 > Rs
l (compare to condition 37). Again, we have that:
1 + r2 >
Rs
l
￿ 1 + r1:
We now check under which conditions 1
pr ￿ 1 + r2 ￿ Rr














































(compare to the similar su¢ cient condition in the main text: prR > ls).60
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We have that 1 + r2 ￿ Rr



















(compare to the necessary condition in the main text: 1
￿2 < 1
lr).30
The following results summarizes this discussion:
Result 3 If there is adverse selection in the unsecured interbank market, i.e. safer banks with a
liquidity shortage do not borrow, the interbank interest rate is given by (B.9) and conditions (B.11)
and (B.12) hold.
The set of parameters for which conditions (B.10), (B.11) and (B.12) hold is non-empty.
Regime 3: Market breakdown
Lenders drop out: Lenders prefer to hoard liquidity by reinvesting it in the liquid asset when the
lower bound in (B.7) is violated, i.e.


















since under adverse selection pr (1 + r2) > pr
Rs
l . It follows that it also has to be that
p￿2 ￿ prE [R] > 0
which yields a condition analogous to (41):
prE [R] < p￿2 < 1:
As in the main text, the necessary condition for liquidity hoarding is that the net present value of
a (hypothetical) asset returning E [R] with probability pr is negative.
Borrowers drop out: Risky borrowers choose to leave the unsecured interbank market if adverse
selection drives the interest rate up too much. The upper bound on the interest rate in (B.7) is
violated when:




30We can re-write condition (B.12) as q (l ￿ ￿h)(psRs ￿ prRr) ￿ prRr (￿ ￿ l). If we have a mean-preserving spread,
i.e. psRs = prRr, then the necessary and su¢ cient condition is simply ￿ ￿ l.61
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In this section, we summarize conditions under which a particular regime constitutes the unique
equilibrium in the interbank market.







This is equivalent to 1 + r2 ￿ Rs
l . The interest rate that would arise under adverse selection is
relatively low and safer borrowers prefer to stay in the market. Hence, adverse selection regime
cannot be an equilibrium.







and conditions (B.11) and (B.12) hold. Then, Rs
l < 1+r1. The interest rate that would arise under
full participation is so high that safer borrowers drop out of the market and hence full participation
cannot be an equilibrium.
Liquidity hoarding is the unique equilibrium if and only if
E[R]
p > Rs
l ￿ and condition (B.11)
fails. Market breakdown due to the drop out of borrowers is the unique equilibrium if and only if
E[R]
p > Rs
l ￿ and condition (B.12) fails.











(compare to the condition (42)).
Both Regimes 1 and 2 are equilibria if conditions (B.11), (B.12), and (B.13) hold. If banks
expect Regime 1 to be an equilibrium, all banks participate in the interbank market and the
resulting interest rate 1 + r1 is smaller than Rs
l , thus justifying banks￿expectations. However, if
banks expect Regime 2 to be an equilibrium, safer banks with a liquidity shortage drop out of the
interbank market and the interest rate is given by 1 + r2 > Rs
l .
Similarly, both Regimes 1 and 3 (liquidity hoarding) are equilibria when conditions (B.13)
and (B.12) hold while condition (B.11) fails. Both Regimes 1 and 3 (borrowers drop out) when
conditions (B.13) and (B.11) hold while condition (B.12) fails.62
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